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This thesis argues that the human-animal divide plays a key role in the work of the writers 
Clarice Lispector and Jorie Graham, and that their explorations and complications of the 
divide in turn shed light on its persistence and the challenges that it poses for linguistic 
representation and for our understanding of human and animal alike.  
The human-animal binary refers to the divide that separates the human from all other 
animal beings. On the one hand, this distinction seems insubstantial: humans are an animal 
species, and the intelligence and subjecthood of nonhuman animals are increasingly 
recognised in science and law. On the other, to suggest that no difference exists between 
humans and other animals is a foolishness similar to suggesting that no difference exists 
between any two species. Although some scholars have claimed that the division has outlived 
its usefulness, attempts to transcend the human-animal divide, both in scholarship and in 
literature, are paradoxically often those most plagued by the return of the binary they seek to 
overcome. The human-animal binary represents an energetic and restless distinction that, as 
Lispector’s and Graham’s work shows, cannot be finally resolved into either a simple 
division between human and animal or an undifferentiated continuity between two indistinct 
terms.   
 Lispector’s and Graham’s interest in writing about animals derives both from the 
mysterious self-worlds of animals and from a preoccupation with testing the limits of 
representation itself. Lispector and Graham make critical use of certain rhetorical strategies—
specifically adynaton, defamiliarisation, and anthropomorphism—to imagine what it might be 
like to be the described animal without claiming to definitively state what that experience is. 
Further, they reciprocally consider the consequences of representing the human as animal: 
Graham worries about the possible loss of moral accountability entailed by a biological 
explanation of human selfhood, whereas Lispector seeks to dissolve the human subject into a 
wider continuum of animal life and matter as an alternative to humanising the world through 
symbolic thought and language. Comparing the authors’ works here makes conspicuous the 
implications of dismantling the human-animal binary and of shirking our moral 
responsibilities as humans.   
Ultimately, this thesis concludes that, while authors like Lispector and Graham cannot 
eradicate the human-animal binary altogether, they can complicate and diversify what each of 
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Not being fish, how do we know their happiness? 
But we may express our feelings in painting.  
In order to probe the subtleties of the ordinary,  
We must describe the indescribable. 
—Zhou Dongqing, “The Pleasure of Fishes” 
What is the difference between a human and an animal? On the one hand, the distinction can 
seem insubstantial: humans are an animal species, and science and law are increasingly 
recognising the consciousness, complex cognitive skills, emotions, social systems, and value 
of nonhuman animal lives. This recent acknowledgement of traits that were previously 
considered the sole property of humans supports Charles Darwin’s percipient statement that 
“the difference in mind between man and the higher animals … certainly is one of degree and 
not of kind” (1981, 105). On the other hand, to suggest that there is no difference between 
humans and other animals is a foolishness similar to suggesting that no difference exists 
between, say, a lion and a goldfish. Jacques Derrida expounds on this point:  
To suppose that I, or anyone else for that matter, could ignore that rupture,  
indeed that abyss, would mean first of all blinding oneself to so much contrary 
evidence; and, as far as my own modest case is concerned, it would mean 
forgetting all the signs that I have sought to give, tirelessly, of my attention to 
difference, to differences, to heterogeneities and abyssal ruptures as against 
the homogeneous and the continuous. I have thus never believed in some 
homogeneous continuity between what calls itself man and what he calls the 
animal. I am not about to begin to do so now. (2002, 398; original emphasis) 
Approaching the human-animal binary, in the Western tradition, at least, thus represents a 
significant difficulty—one which is energetic and restless, and which cannot be finally 
resolved into either a simple division between human and animal or an undifferentiated 
continuity between two indistinct terms. What this thesis will demonstrate, however, through 
reading the works of Clarice Lispector and Jorie Graham, is that thinking and writing about 
the relations between humans and animals need not fall into either of these positions, but can 
instead work to complicate and deconstruct (without ever entirely dismantling) the human-
animal divide. By complicating but not effacing the human-animal binary, authors such as 
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Lispector and Graham can hope to de-naturalise harmful narratives about human 
exceptionality. They can also hope to counteract examples where the distinction between 
human and animal is entirely elided such that we neglect that, as humans, we are reliant on 
representations of animals in order to understand them, and that these representations can 
have tangible effects on both their and our own lives.   
To some scholars and critics, particularly those working in the areas of postcolonial, 
posthumanist, and intersectional feminist schools of thought, focussing on a binary 
relationship between humans and animals—or, “self” and “other”—may seem outmoded. 
There is a strong drive in contemporary scholarship, and in particular new materialism, to 
generate new schema to conceptualise the correspondence and interrelations between various 
beings and their environment. For example, social quantum theory describes the relations 
between the world’s diverse agents (both human and nonhuman) as a web of interdependent 
and response-able parts, modelled as entangled particles in multi-nodal networks (see in 
particular O’Brien 2016; Barad 2007; Barad 2010). Alternatively, Donna Haraway imagines 
human-animal relations as the bonds of “oddkin,” joined together as collaborative and 
connected players in a game of “string figures” (Haraway 2016, 2–3). These theories have 
great merit as a means of recontextualising our relationships to other species by decentring 
the human subject. They also offer an attractive framework for emphasising the agents’ 
ability to affect one another as a system of interconnected nodes that are contingent upon 
each other in a material world, even when unaware of others’ actions or presence.   
I contend, however, that it is overhasty to assume that we can simply move on from 
the human-animal binary. In fact, the greatest efforts to transcend the human-animal divide 
are paradoxically often those which are most plagued by the return of the binary they seek to 
overcome. In the theories cited above, for example, the animals that are represented by 
hypothetical nodes in interconnected networks are actually further from our understanding as 
individual living beings than the subjects of scientific studies that observe and describe 
animals from a single, human point of view, or anthropomorphising stories that at least 
attempt to describe what it might be like to be such an animal. The animals in these “post-
binary” models resemble moving parts in a simulation or game with the effect that these 
models cannot offer any further understanding or imagining of the animals’ diverse 
conditions and experiences of being. The animals’ existence in these models is purely that 
which is afforded to them within the play of human hypotheticals.  
While these post-binary models may not have yet provided a satisfactory alternative 
to the binary that currently defines human-animal relations, the necessity of rethinking our 
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relationships with other species remains urgent. Increased awareness of the cruel conditions 
of industrial farming, growing evidence of diverse animal intelligences, the enormous loss of 
biodiversity in the Sixth Mass Extinction due to climate change, and the resulting turn of 
large numbers of people towards vegan or vegetarian lifestyles (Hancox 2018) have 
contributed to a corresponding growth in the study of animals and human-animal relations in 
the humanities over the past twenty to thirty years.1 Gathered together under the umbrella 
term “animal studies,” this interdisciplinary field loosely includes any work that enquires into 
the economic, cultural, or aesthetic relations between humans and animals, and/or the 
quandaries of animal representation by humans—both in the sense of “portrayal” and 
“advocacy” (McKay 2018, 308; original emphasis).  
While some animal studies works are avowedly “post-binary” (see Oliver 2009; 
Ohrem and Bartosch 2017; Westling 2017), the vast majority of this literature—including 
many of those same “post-binary” studies—are explicitly engaged in interrogating the 
relations between humans and animals (rather than, say, considering the relations between a 
number of different nonhuman animal species), and the work of representation that occurs on 
the “human” side of this divide. The extent to which human-animal relations touch nearly 
every field in the humanities is evident through the large number of disciplines that have 
contributed work to animal studies, including ethics and politics (Oliver 2009; Oliver 2017; 
Creed 2017; Ohrem 2017; Simons 2002), analytic philosophy (Nagel 1974), film and media 
studies (Creed 2017; Malamud 2017), theology (Meyer 2018), narratology (Herman 2016; 
Herman 2018; McHugh 2011), literary studies more generally, and poetics—or 
“zoopoetics”—more specifically (Moe, 2014; Driscoll and Hoffman, 2018). For this project, I 
am particularly interested in the vein of animal studies which examines the uneasy yet 
productive interaction between animal lives and the abstract human language used to describe 
them (see Malay 2018; McKay 2018; Oerlemans 2018; Pick 2011; Roscher 2017; Simons 
2002). 
Capturing animal lives in language poses an intractable problem: writers of animal 
texts may be able to describe an animal’s appearance, behaviour, and its relationships with 
other animals, but they cannot describe for certain what it is like to be that animal. Thus, 
when describing an animal, authors are presented with two unhappy possibilities. They can 
                                                             
1 For a brief overview of the history of animal studies, see Lori Gruen’s introduction in 
Critical Terms for Animal Studies (2018, 1–5). 
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approach the animal in ironic, provisional language that attempts to respect the animal’s 
difference and unknowability. These attempts, however, often result in the animal 
disappearing into the author’s idiosyncratic language, such that they remain at an 
unbridgeable distance of complete otherness from the language in which they are described. 
This technique often leaves the living animal in second place to the verbal gymnastics or 
ingenuity of the author. As Michael Malay puts it, “this kind of difficulty” in textual strategy, 
while signalling an attempt towards “an ethical act, a stubborn gesture aimed at preserving 
the otherness of the stranger,” may instead “tell us nothing about ecological others and 
everything about the poet” (2018, 199).2 Alternatively, authors may approach this problem by 
describing their animal figures in straightforward terms that are made comprehensible to a 
human reader by anthropomorphising the animals’ experience so that they fit within the 
scope of human understanding and expression. This second approach, however, also falls 
short of accurate animal representation because it trivialises the alterity of the animal’s 
experience.   
In short, an animal’s representation in text can overwhelm the actuality of the living 
animal that it describes. As we will see from the works analysed in this thesis, even attempts 
at the most concrete representation of an animal (one that closely attends to the animal’s 
particularities and ways of being) also always read, to some degree, as a metaphorical and 
allegorical—i.e., human-orientated—figure. In fact, it is often when language is used to 
signify most earnestly and ardently its author’s desire to describe an animal, and to 
acknowledge its distance from what the author can know about it, that the text conversely 
achieves the opposite and the animal becomes wrought in highly figurative language.  
Rather than this crisis of representation being a total impasse, however, I argue that 
the apparently insoluble and layered boundary between the human and the animal can instead 
stimulate particularly creative and ingenious aesthetic responses. These responses not only 
prove productive for the authors of such work but can also provide new ways of approaching 
or imagining animal life for the reader. 
                                                             
2 Malay makes this point only to suggest that, while the poetics of Les Murray (the author to 
whom he was referring) might present difficult texts whose estranging tactics tell us very 
little about the animals they describe, they do still represent a concerted effort to respect the 
difference of those animal beings.  
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This thesis asks: what can writers teach us about the human-animal divide, its 
paradoxes, and its persistence despite efforts to try to overcome it? And, moving from the 
opposite direction, how does this binary stimulate and influence the works of those who seek 
to think and write about animals and animality? 
The works of Clarice Lispector (1920–1977) and Jorie Graham (1950– ), in particular, 
offer revealing and sophisticated responses to the human-animal divide and its effect on 
animal representation. Rather than turn away from this formidable challenge, Lispector and 
Graham instead stay in the discomfort of the uneasy distinction between “human” and 
“animal,” and probe the binary “not to efface the limit, but to multiply its figures, to 
complicate, thicken, delinearise, fold, and divide the line precisely by making it increase and 
multiply” (Derrida 2002, 398). And, in writing such texts, both writers respond to the 
difficulty of animal representation while also helping to illuminate the reasons for this 
difficulty in the first place.  
Lispector and Graham are both distinctive for their exploration of—or perhaps, more 
accurately, worrying at—the limits of human perception, thought, and language in their 
desire to think and write “where the incomprehensible begins” (Cixous 1990, 56). And both 
use animals as a focal point for rendering this preoccupation concrete and identifiable in their 
works. For Lispector and Graham, innovative and unorthodox approaches to language are 
required in order to respond to the contradiction at the heart of animal representation. Both 
authors recognise, on the one hand, that the animal’s experience is beyond the boundary of 
language’s descriptive powers. But, on the other hand, they also recognise that animal 
representations are necessary tools for drawing attention to, and suggesting, the different-
from-human experience of those same animals (a movement that also mirrors the 
distinct/continuous nature of the existential human-animal boundary).  
Lispector and Graham also share a position of “outsider from within,” as women who 
migrated to other countries, and who write in their second and third language, respectively 
(Eberstadt 2009; Vieira 2009; Edemariam 2017). Their consequent awareness—both of how 
the signifiers assigned to experiences and objects in the world are essentially arbitrary in their 
designation, and of how these designations can fail to account for experiences “other” to 
dominant structures and modes of being—lends their work a certain affinity or sensitivity 
towards animals, as beings whose experiences are at an even further remove from recognition 
and containment in language. The authors’ interest in writing animal figures, then, derives 
both from the animals themselves and from the act of representation and what it can and 
cannot achieve.  
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Despite the abundance of animal figures in both Lispector’s and Graham’s works, 
scholars have largely neglected the role of these animals in their philosophical, historical,  
psychological, and formal readings of the texts.3 As I will show, however, reading 
Lispector’s and Graham’s texts through the lens of animal studies offers new insights into all 
these elements of their work—from philosophy to form—and, more broadly, into the literary 
problems and possibilities of animal representation.   
Unlike many animal-centric writers, Lispector and Graham approach the human-
animal binary from both sides of the divide (inasmuch as this is possible when writing from 
“the human” side of the binary). Not only do they imagine what the subjectivity of an animal 
might be, they also consider what it means to be a human animal. While there are many 
authors who have written animal characters and imagined their lives (with more or less 
success), far fewer have imperilled the safety of their position as humans to “become” 
animal, and fewer still maintain this uncomfortable imagining without it somehow returning 
to a fable or commentary on human society. Whether or not Lispector and Graham manage to 
successfully bracket their humanised ways of seeing when imagining animal life—or whether 
or not this is, in fact, achievable at all—is debatable. I argue, however, that what sets their 
work apart is their earnest attempt to reach into the folds of the human-animal divide, not 
only by diversifying and enriching our idea of what it is to be an “animal” but also by 
interrupting and making multiple the category of the “human.” 
Attending to the form and rhetorical strategies of Lispector’s and Graham’s texts is 
critical to this project. Literature provides an essential contribution to animal studies through 
its strong tradition of exploring alternative ways of being without these imaginings being 
confined to statements of fact—something apparent, for example, in the fantasies of science 
fiction, or, for our purposes, when describing the experience of what it might be like to be a 
given animal. Through this rhetorical mode, literature is able to distance readers to some 
                                                             
3 There are some exceptions to this claim in the case of Lispector. A small number of scholars 
have found purchase on her novel The Passion according to G.H. using Deleuze’s and 
Guattari’s essay “Becoming Animal” (Braidotti 1994; Goh 2009; Goh 2016; Ittner 2005). 
Apart from Jutta Ittner’s chapter, however, which does spend some time considering the 
effect of how Lispector anthropomorphises her animal characters, my project varies from 
these essays in that they treat Lispector’s animal figures as true-to-form animal beings, 
without concern for how they are represented (through metaphor) in her texts.   
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degree from their typical attitudes and understandings of the objects and relations described. 
Animal-centric literature, in particular, can help readers to identify and recognise the relations 
between humans and animals that might otherwise go unacknowledged, and, at times, can 
even help destabilise or edit the structures that shape those relations. It is this characteristic 
that differentiates this kind of literary practice from other, still vitally important, disciplinary 
practices. For example, biologists and ecologists provide essential information about animal 
lives that also influence attitudes towards animal being, but they can only do so within the 
scientific method of gathering information to support or reject certain hypotheses. The 
subjective experiences of animals cannot be tested for or falsified, however. Literature does 
not have to say definitely how or what something is, or is not, in order to imagine how it 
might be, and is therefore able to be more flexible in its claims. Lyn Hejinian writes that, by 
operating in the rhetorical space of “as if,” perspectival and experimental exercises in writing 
are able to “to know that things are. But this is not knowledge in the strictest sense; it is, 
rather, acknowledgement—and that constitutes a sort of unknowing. To know that things are 
is not to know what they are, and to know that without what is to know otherness” (Hejinian 
2000, 2). Writing this kind of provisional text—that is, a text that creates a space for the 
experience of an other without ultimately stating what that experience actually is—can serve 
as an “acknowledgement as a preservation of otherness—a notion that can be offered in a 
political, as well as an epistemological, context” (Hejinian 2000, 2–3). When applied to 
animal representation, Lispector and Graham use the formal and rhetorical capabilities of 
literature to assert that animals do have a subjective experience, even if we cannot state 
exactly what this experience is (as it is necessarily perceived and imagined from the human 
author’s point of view). By doing so, the authors preserve some of the “otherness” of the 
animals they describe.   
In this sense, animal representations need not be automatically viewed as the failure 
of language to grasp the true reality of its living animal object. They can instead be 
understood as the possibility to imagine the experiences of nonhuman animal beings that 
could otherwise not take place. This tension between understanding animal representation as 
inherently limited or as a conceptual tool for imagining life beyond the human is comparable 
to the tension that Christopher Prendergast identifies as defining representation more 
generally. Prendergast refutes the claim that, in certain circumstances, representation is not 
possible:  
Everything is representable … What is presumably meant when we say that 
something is unrepresentable is that any given (or conceivable) representation 
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is inadequate to what it seeks to represent, thus invoking, if only negatively, 
the model of adequatio and an associated correspondence theory of truth. It is 
not that representation as such is impossible, it is rather that it fails in its task, 
thus failing under a negative valuation or, more radically, under prohibition. 
(2000, 2–3)  
This model of “adequatio,” he acknowledges, however, can be turned another way:  
An alternative view … has been to invoke adequatio (or its converse) on 
pragmatic grounds: a representation is adequate to some purpose or other, and 
human purposes can vary according to needs and interests in ways entirely 
irrelevant to the epistemological concerns of a correspondence theory of truth. 
A corollary of this alternative view is mise en abîme: the contingent origins 
and partial dimensions of a representation are and should be—there is some 
uneasy sliding between the descriptive and prescriptive—marked in the 
representation itself, rather than merely suppressed in the reach for a 
correspondence between the representation and the truth of the (or a) world. 
(3) 
It is important to note, as Prendergast does, that representations shaped to human needs or 
purposes irrespective of their correspondence to lived “truth” invest the tool of representation 
with a certain degree of power—particularly when the “truth” it describes is that of an animal 
which cannot speak for, or represent, itself. Foregrounding language’s workings and 
rhetorical strategies is therefore one way to advertise that any description an author 
undertakes is one that contains certain assumptions, originates from a certain background, 
and is reliant on “human choices and conventions” (Prendergast 2000, 9). Thus, by 
emphasising the provisional and perspectival nature of their works, authors can create self-
reflexive texts that attempt to counteract representation’s “strong in-built tendency to self-
naturalisation” (9).  
 Lispector and Graham are two such authors. Both make the workings of their 
representation visible within the representational act. In general terms, they achieve this 
visibility through a complicating or disrupting of language’s typical syntax and form, 
drawing attention to how the language works to represent (or fails to represent) its described 
objects. More specifically, Lispector and Graham use the tools of defamiliarisation 
(ostranenie) to unsettle naturalised approaches to animals and animality, and adynaton 
(impossibilia) to suggest the ultimate impossibility of capturing “true” animal experience in 
human text.  
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Coined by Viktor Shklovsky in 1917, defamiliarisation operates through estranging 
descriptions of the familiar and everyday so that readers might be plucked from their 
automatic or “default” perspectives to see the world afresh—or, in some cases, from the point 
of view of an “other” (Shklovsky 2015). In fact, Shklovsky’s key example of literary 
defamiliarisation is provided from an animal’s point of view. Quoting a section from Leo 
Tolstoy’s short story “Strider,” Shklovsky describes how—by using the perspective of the 
horse Kholstomer—Tolstoy defamiliarises readers from the human institution of property and 
re-introduces them to its absurdity:  
Thinking about this all the time, and only after the most diverse experiences 
with people, did I finally understand what meaning they ascribe to these 
strange words. Their meaning is this: in life, people are ruled not by acts but 
by words. They love not so much the possibility of doing or not doing 
something as the possibility of talking about different things using certain 
words, on which they agree beforehand. Such are the words “my” and “mine,” 
which they use to talk about different things, creatures, topics, and even about 
land, about people, and about horses. They agree that only one person may say 
“mine” about any particular thing. And the one who says “mine” about the 
greatest number of things, in this game whose rules they’ve made up among 
themselves, is considered the happiest. (Tolstoy quoted by Shklovsky 2015, 
164) 
Tolstoy here uses the imaginary perspective of the horse to provide an external view on the 
workings of human society and their “strange words” that designate the ownership of 
everything from land and objects to living beings. In this example, Tolstoy uses 
defamiliarisation to provide an apparently “animal” view on human affairs. The technique 
can also be used, however, to imagine how another creature might experience reality by 
describing events or objects in ways that may seem unusual to the human reader, but which 
reflect the point of view of the animal’s sensory world. Both uses of defamiliarisation seek to 
offer the reader a renewed imagining of their world through an estranging point of view. 
Lispector and Graham use defamiliarisation with a certain critical restraint, demonstrating the 
new perspectives or awareness that this trope can engender while staying wary of some of its 
proponents’ more utopian claims.  
Adynaton is a rhetorical trope used by an author to suggest the failure of language, 
often through an act of hyperbole so excessive that it parades its own impossibility (Galvin 
2017; Griffiths 2007, 93–110). To use an example from Shakespeare, adynaton suggests that 
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there are such experiences in reality that: “more it is than I can well express” ([1594] n.d.). 
Lispector and Graham both use adynaton in order to persuade the reader of the impossibility 
of representing their animal figures in text. The trope offers the authors a certain duality or 
flexibility in their representation: they are simultaneously able to suggest, or make a presence 
for the other life worlds of the animal figures they depict while also advertising the failure of 
their language to accurately describe those same animals. The authors generally do not use 
adynaton in service of facetiousness or false modesty, however, but instead as a sincere 
attempt to remain responsible to what cannot be said about the non-linguistic, nonhuman 
animal worlds they describe.  
The earlier of the two authors, Lispector, was primarily interested in animal 
representation as a means of finding new ways to communicate experiences that lie outside of 
dominant modes of expression. While considered a prodigy in her home country of Brazil 
following the publication of her debut novel at age twenty-three, Lispector only garnered an 
international reputation some years later. She was particularly celebrated in France for her 
innovative and philosophical investigations into the interplay between language (and human 
structures more generally) and subjecthood (the awareness of one’s being), drawing parallels 
with philosophers such as Spinoza, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Agamben (Marder 
2013; Sousa 1989; Shiminovich 1993; Jones 2007). Her work has been labelled as the 
“missing link between … existentialism and structuralism” for its liminal position between 
“risk, choice, [and freedom] achieved by throwing off learned social roles and received 
categories of thought,” while recognising that these “categories of thought … [are] 
inescapably binding because they are embedded in language itself” (Ruta 1989).  
Lispector’s philosophical play, and the tension between “throwing off” categories of 
thought simultaneous to an acknowledgement of their embeddedness “in language itself,” 
find a fitting home in her representation of animal figures. Through imagining animal life, 
Lispector imagines an alternative way of being—one free from social mores—but also 
encounters the lively difficulty of representing that unmediated and unabstracted state within 
the structures of human expression.  
Lispector attempts to write from both sides of the human-animal binary to reach into 
the liminal spaces in between. First, in her animal-centric short stories, Lispector describes a 
range of exotic and domestic animals from a distinctly human, anthropomorphising point of 
view. I have selected two representative examples to discuss in this thesis: “The Buffalo” 
(2015; “O búfalo,” 1998b) and “A Chicken” (2015; “Uma galinha,” 1998b). In my analysis 
of these stories, I demonstrate Lispector’s unusual use of anthropomorphism and what her 
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writing can teach us about this much-maligned trope. Anthropomorphism is widely criticised 
for interpreting animal behaviours in ways that assume human-like intentions, understanding, 
and experience of the world. Lispector uses this trope in a way that recognises its necessarily 
limited, human point of view to demonstrate that it is still possible to suggest the rich self-
world of animals, even when we can only apprehend these other worlds through the frames of 
human perception and understanding. In the two novels that I analyse—The Passion 
According to G.H. (2012; A paxião segundo G.H., 2013) and Água Viva (1998a; The Stream 
of Life, 19894)—however, Lispector meditates upon the human characters’ own animality. 
These texts explore the implications of recognising the self as an animal whose existence is 
not based on social conventions, rules, or declarative structures, but on an inherent livingness 
that extends across all animal species.  
In the first of these two approaches, Lispector’s animal representations are elegantly 
placed so that they are neither dry philosophical ruminations on the animal condition, nor 
sentimentalised accounts that diminish the unknowability of the animals she describes. In the 
second, Lispector is concerned with capturing the prelogical and prediscursive parts of the 
human setup that she suggests precede our sense of self and autobiographical consciousness. 
She finds these moments in experiences where subjectivised description and consciousness 
fall away, so that the individual feels only their sensation of being—as when in passion, 
beatitude, and ecstasy. In describing these moments, however, she becomes troubled by how, 
or indeed whether, she should create abstract forms for such experiences, as “to say 
something betrays something. What is tragic is that the word separates” (Cixous 1990, 16). 
The burden of being human is that “‘thinking’ is born right away and becomes part of the 
tragedy” (Cixous 1990, 29). Lispector’s novels thus attempt to reconcile a binary between 
felt, sub- or un-conscious “animal” sensation and structured, thinking, “human” 
consciousness that coexist within the self.  
Graham, too, is interested in capturing those elusive parts of one’s experience that 
escape conscious thought. Her poetry mines the visible world for those ephemeral or 
immaterial things that hover adjacent to the lyric subject’s perception. The primary tension in 
                                                             
4 The 1989 English translation used the title The Stream of Life in a nod to the title’s literal 
translation as “living water” while also referring to its stream-of-consciousness narrative 
style. This choice limits the alternative readings of the novel’s title (which I will discuss in 
the fourth chapter of this thesis), and later translations have chosen to retain the Portuguese.  
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Graham’s work exists in the gap between “the given” of the world’s matter and the 
interpretation of the human mind that works to understand it (Vendler 1995, 92; Vendler 
2003). This fixation has rendered much of Graham’s poetry a study of frustrated vision, in 
which the lyric subject is unable to capture the objects she describes, finding instead that 
“what’s real slides through” (Graham, “Manifest Destiny,” 1993).  
Graham evokes this bewildering loss of descriptive potency in a number of ways. 
First, rather than a single, dominant voice, Graham captures the given moment through a 
multiplicity of voices, strung between hyphens or captured in parentheses, presenting a 
multifractal view of the objects they describe. Here, “I” becomes a cipher for an assemblage 
of selves that must frame and re-frame their objects, as each single perspective misses 
something of what they attempt to capture in sight, thought, or language. While her style 
changes from book to book, Graham has become known for her disconcerting changes in line 
length, an idiosyncratic use of em dashes (and more recently colons), the Hopkins-esque 
“outrider,”5 and placeholders in her text such as indefinite pronouns (“it”), vague nouns 
(“thing”), algebraic substitutes (“x”), and blanks (“_______”), all of which circumvent the 
need to name the unpronounceable things that exist alongside the speaker’s articulated 
experience (Kirsch 2008; Henry 1998; Gardner 2005; Bedient 2005; Frost 2005; Yenser 
2005; Shifrer 2005; Costello 2005; Spiegelman 2007). Graham’s unusual syntax and 
fractured language enact her hunger to view poetic objects from every possible angle in order 
to capture all, while also making visible—through concrete acts of adynaton—those gaps in 
perception where some hidden quality of the objects resides. Graham’s choice to include her 
struggle to see and describe within her representational acts has led to her poems being 
characterised as “provisional victories over their own inefficacy” (Chiasson 2015). 
However, while many critics have identified Graham’s struggle to represent reality in 
text, few have recognised the centrality of animals to that struggle. 6 This thesis aims to 
correct this omission. I demonstrate that by attending to how Graham depicts animals we can 
learn a great deal both about the challenges of animal representation—especially when 
                                                             
5 The indenting of a single word, or pair of words, along the right-hand margin.  
6 Just under half (twenty-eight out of sixty-one) of her first volume of collected works, The 
Dream of the Unified Field (2002a), and a little over half (twenty-six out of forty-eight) of 
her second volume of collected works The Taken-Down God (2013) include animal figures 
(either literal and metaphorical, or, more accurately, always somewhere in between). 
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considered through the poetry of an author renowned for her careful attention and 
philosophical rigour—as well as how these difficulties have in turn influenced and shaped her 
works.  
In Graham’s first two collections—Hybrids of Plants and of Ghosts (1980) and 
Erosion (1983)—animals appear as highly wrought, avowedly metaphorical stand-ins for 
some other meaning Graham wishes to convey. Later, they begin to slip from poetic control, 
signifying an absence in her knowing and a failure of her language such that the animals 
simply disappear into ellipses or blanks. During this middle period, animals also tend to 
represent a pre-Edenic ideal of an innate union with nature of which humans are bereft. No 
longer able to experience and know the world without the mediation of thought and language, 
Graham’s speakers are filled with a desire to describe and make models of it, no matter how 
limited, in order to give it shape, and to know it through representation so that there is the 
sensation of knowing and “rightness seems to root” (Graham, “The Guardian Angel of the 
Little Utopia,” 1998). However, at this point in her career, we can already see the beginnings 
of a change in Graham’s animal descriptions and an increased awareness of their experience 
in the world as subjects in their own right. This change sees her representation of animals 
transform from completely unknowable others to fellow creatures, and, further, creatures who 
might also be able to reveal something about what it is to be human.  
While Graham has long tested the limitations of human perception, thought, and 
language as biologically mediated processes, her exasperation about what these limits might 
mean for the future of humans and other species only becomes fully apparent in her 
collections Never (2002b) and Overlord (2005). Never reflects Graham’s distress at the 
onrushing climate crisis and the mass extinction of animals (around nine species every 
minute at the time of her writing), while Overlord grieves the transformation of the unified 
human subject into an object of scientific study that is increasingly described in impersonal 
terms. Responding to the rising dominance of cognitive sciences, and the associated belief 
that “everything psychological is biological,” Graham worries deeply about the loss of 
political agency and ethical responsibility that may occur if we choose to see humans as 
biologically determined creatures (Skillman 2016). She is also deeply troubled about the 
harm humans might perpetuate within and across species lines if we are to shirk a sense of 
discrete human selfhood that can be held accountable for the consequences of its actions.  
 In examining the human-animal binary through a close reading of selected works 
from Lispector and Graham, I will first work from one side of the binary then the other—with 
the understanding that these two categories are not clearly distinct, that there is no one, 
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clearly defined way of being “human” or “animal,” and that there will necessarily be some 
overlap between the scope of the two approaches.7 These two approaches will form the two 
movements of the thesis: “Representing the Animal” and, to borrow Deleuze’s and Guattari’s 
term (2007), “Becoming-Animal.”  
To first clarify the theoretical and representational issues of writing animal characters, 
I start from the “animal” side of the human-animal divide. This first movement includes two 
chapters that identify the strategies each author uses to represent animal beings. In the first 
chapter, I analyse selected poems from Graham’s oeuvre to show the development of her 
approach towards writing into the human-animal binary—from her early poetry that clearly 
positions her human speaker as the observing subject of the animal object she describes, to 
animals that disappear or slide from her text and understanding, and then her later recognition 
of animals not only as a rhetorical or linguistic challenge but as sensing and experiencing 
subjects in their own right. In the second chapter, I compare two of Lispector’s short stories 
to demonstrate how she uses both a naïve and a more critical approach to anthropomorphism 
to represent her animal figures. In discussing these two forms or levels of anthropomorphism, 
I consider the difference between an anthropocentric and an animal-centric reading of animal 
being, and judge which might engender a more substantial and enduring change in how 
human individuals conceive of, and care for, animal others.   
In the second movement of the thesis, which is also divided into a further two 
chapters, I begin from the “human” side of the human-animal binary to explore the 
consequences of writing about the human as animal. In chapter 3, I analyse Graham’s 
concerns about modern science’s dedication to thinking of the human subject as a 
biologically defined (perhaps even determined) being, and the possible loss of agency this 
creatural selfhood entails. In chapter 4, and in direct contrast to Graham’s appeal for 
maintaining a belief in the moral human self, I illustrate how Lispector embraces the 
dissolution of the human subject into a wider continuum of animal being in her novels The 
Passion According to G.H. and Água Viva. For Lispector, animal figures and animality offer 
a way of apprehending the innate livingness of being that pre-exists the human shaping of the 
                                                             
7 Of course, one cannot ignore the inevitable skew toward the human author when 
approaching the human-animal divide from either side, but nor should we consider the author 
alone; the animal, too, collaborates in textual practice through their own being and makings 
that prick the author’s interest and stimulates their desire to describe that moment in text.   
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world through language and consciousness—a state she desires to access in order to see the 
world as it really is, uncoloured by acculturated and socialised modes of seeing. It should be 
noted that, although this movement is called “Becoming-Animal,” there is no single, 
definitive way of being or becoming “animal.” Beyond the human there are countless animal 
worlds and ways of being that are as equally complete and distinct from each other as we 
conceive the human world to be. What I am interested in demonstrating in this second half of 
my thesis, then, are the ways in which Graham and Lispector imagine and explore their own 
animality as human beings. My focus is thus not restricted to exploring how human 
characters might imagine or embody animal modes beyond the human (although this is 
something I will touch on in chapter 4). I am instead more concerned with investigating how 
these authors deeply consider their characters’ own conditions of being—as humans, and, 
therefore, already as animals.    
The question that I posed at the outset of this thesis—“What is the difference between 
a human and an animal?”—was, as is already apparent, deceptively straightforward. And 
while there may be no easy answers to this question, there are still significant consequences 
that result from how we conceive of and represent the profound continuities and differences 
between human and nonhuman ways of being. Our relations with nonhuman others touch on 
almost every sphere of our daily lives, including our diet, clothing, land use, religions, 
economy, and innumerable other instances where human lifestyles are intimately dependent 
upon animal lives. In our current period of imminent environmental collapse, in particular, 
we urgently need tools that help us to deeply consider, and really feel, the presence of those 
rapidly disappearing worlds of other animal species. Further, we need tools that help us to 
conceive of our own human selves as equally fragile animal beings. Lispector’s and 
Graham’s works provide insight into how we might achieve these tasks, the difficulties we 
might encounter, and the crucial role literature plays in helping us to imagine worlds beyond 








First Movement: Representing the Animal 
1. Graham’s Animal Figures: Animal Signs and Human Making 
Jorie Graham opens her poetry collection The Errancy (1998) with an epigraph from Sir 
Thomas Wyatt: “Since in a net I seek to hold the wind.” Wyatt’s expression of unrequited 
love (figured as a forsaken hunter trailing behind his quarry, a deer) takes on new meaning 
when Graham uses it to gloss the poems that follow. These poems struggle to catch the 
wealth of reality in the porous net of static language that is directed and limited by the 
interpreting mind: “reaching forever towards a contour of sense-experience deeply known in 
the body, but unavailable in language except through the mind’s mediation” (Vendler 2003). 
Graham is particularly interested in those things which are not readily available to our 
comprehension and representation—whether it be the action of perception itself, the 
unlocatable meeting place of our environment and consciousness, or the palimpsestic 
lingering of history and the implications of the future condensed within the present moment. 
Through her poetry, then, she seeks to perform an impracticable task: creating a web of 
material signs that might “capture or name the ephemeral, the invisible, the unnameable” 
(Spiegelman 2007, 194). Writing texts that deal in the ineffable repays the author with myriad 
frustrations, and Graham’s attempts to grasp her diffuse and intangible objects in sight, 
thought, and language prove as exasperating as Wyatt’s yearning to stay the wind. And this is 
especially true for her poems that seek to represent the unknowable worlds of animal others. 
For Graham, like Wyatt in his pursuit of the hind, capturing animals in the net of text offers 
its own “vain travail” (Wyatt n.d.).  
Graham’s early animal figures are opaque. They are wholly inscrutable others that 
stand as a reminder to the speaker of what she cannot know beyond the edge of her own 
necessarily limited perception. If understanding other humans can be difficult, Graham’s 
animals demonstrate that “the vast interstices between human points of view are nothing to 
the differences of perspective that gape between species—species whose modes of 
perception, behaviour, and thought reflect specialised purposes” (Skillman 2016, 214).  
The abyss between human and animal ways of being constitutes a significant 
difficulty for Graham’s animal poetry. Human individuals typically share a similar sensory 
system and the ability to use symbolic language, and it is this second trait—even if the 
language spoken between the human subjects is not the same—that makes it relatively easy 
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for people to assume and assign complex and familiar mental states to others.8 This “theory 
of mind” relies upon a “leap of analogy” that helps us to “infer the nature of conscious 
experiences in other people” through comparison with our own (Stamp Dawkins 1998, 12). 
Animal needs and behaviours are not human needs and behaviours, however, and, when 
attempting to understand them through analogy with the human, the results can ultimately 
stifle and even harm animals’ distinctly different conditions of being.9  
Jakob von Uexküll names the “phenomenal” or “self-world” of animals, including the 
human, their Umwelt. To understand this concept, he encourages his readers to imagine “a 
soap bubble around each creature to represent its own world, filled with the perceptions 
which it alone knows” (1992 [1934], 319). The first principle of von Uexküll’s Umwelt 
theory is that “all animals are fitted into their unique worlds with equal completeness. A 
simple world”—that is, one that relies on few perceptual cues to elicit behaviour—
"corresponds to a simple animal, a well-articulated world to a complex one” (324). Our 
greatest mistake when considering the Umwelten of other animals, he argues, is when we 
assume “that the relationship between a foreign subject [i.e. a nonhuman animal] and the 
objects in his world exist on the same spatial and temporal plane as our own relations with 
                                                             
8 The degree to which this attribution is afforded to others does, of course, vary. The 
difference in willingness (unconscious or not) to assume these traits of other people is 
perhaps the most characteristic symptom of prejudice—for example, where it manifests as 
dehumanisation based on race, gender, sexuality, or difference of ability.   
9 Take, for example, the phenomenon of capture myopathy or a “catastrophic surge of 
adrenaline” resulting in illness or death due to close contact with a potential predator—an 
event that often occurs when wild animals are kept in captivity by humans. The cardiologist 
Barbara Natterson-Horowitz recounts being called to Los Angeles Zoo to help perform a 
heart surgery on an emperor tamarin. Before the surgery, she describes wanting “this 
defenceless little animal to understand how much I felt her vulnerability,” and so crouched 
close, opening her eyes wide and cooing as she had done over the years with human patients 
to “establish a trust bond” and put them “at ease” (2012, 4). Natterson-Horowitz’s behaviour 
was not in line with the needs of the monkey, however, and after being warned by a colleague 
about the risk of capture myopathy, she realised that: “my compassionate gaze wasn’t 
communicating, ‘You’re so cute; don’t be afraid; I’m here to help you.’ It said ‘I’m starving; 
you look delicious; I’m going to eat you’” (4). 
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the objects in the human world. This fallacy is fed by a belief in the existence of a single 
world to which all living creatures are pigeonholed” (327).  
Reality, according to von Uexküll, does not determine our subjective experiences, but 
rather our subjective experiences determine our reality, our Umwelt:  
Only when this fact is clearly grasped shall we recognise the soap bubble 
which encloses each of us as well. Then we shall also see all our fellow men in 
their individual soap bubbles, which intersect each other smoothly, because 
they are built up of subjective perceptual signs. There is no space independent 
of subjects. If we still cling to the fiction of an all-encompassing universal 
space, we do so only because this conventional fable facilitates mutual 
communication. (1992, 338–339) 
To accept the position that an objective shared space between human and nonhuman subjects 
is a fallacy—except when it is realised in the moments where the perceptual signs of their 
Umwelten overlap—is distressing to writers like Graham who are, in fact, attempting to 
communicate within and across species lines. Here, Graham confronts the double-faced 
dilemma of being limited by her own Umwelt as well as being barred access from the equally 
self-contained phenomenal worlds of animal others. 
The philosopher Thomas Nagel famously poses von Uexküll’s proposition exactly in 
a thought experiment that demonstrates our limited ability to imagine and describe another 
animal’s experience using the example of a bat—an animal that we are fairly happy to afford 
a rich Umwelt as a mammal, but one which also uses a vastly different sensory apparatus to 
the human (Nagel 1974, 436). Due to the bat’s difference in morphology and perception (one 
that relies on sound over sight), Nagel argues that there is “no reason to suppose” that being a 
bat “is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine” (438). He surmises that 
“reflection on what it is like to be a bat seems to lead us, therefore, to the conclusion that 
there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in human language” 
(441). We can observe the bat closely, and make a record of these observations in statistics 
and linguistic signs, but we are unable, Nagel asserts, to make any verifiable statements on 
what it is like to subjectively be that bat.  
Nagel’s statement—that there are facts of life not expressible in human language—
presents a perfect crisis in animal representation. And this crisis is keenly felt by a poet like 
Graham who “thirsts” for a vision with “no errancy,” and who harbours a desire to see and 
know reality without the restriction of the mind’s narration (Graham 1998, 78). There are 
times in Graham’s poetry where the limits of her perception, especially when tasked with 
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representing the unknowable world of an animal other, place such stress on her language that 
she fails to find words at all. We can see this breakdown of language in “The Guardian Angel 
of the Little Utopia,” for example, which describes the speaker’s miscarried interaction with a 
cricket in her garden. On drawing near to the insect, she encounters an animal who falls 
through the net of the poem’s text, creating a gap or hole in its representational continuity:  
Yellow sky.    
Faint cricket in the dried-out bush. 
As I approach, my footfall in the leaves  
drowns out the cricket-chirping I was 
coming close to hear . . . . 
(Graham 1998, 1; original ellipsis) 
Despite the speaker “coming close to hear” the cricket, she provides no further description of 
the insect or its song. Instead, the weight of her physical, intentional, and linguistic approach 
“drowns out” the cricket’s chirping, and the sentence breaks down into an ellipsis. This 
concrete act of adynaton speaks to the difficulty of representing not only the cricket but all 
animals. Even if the speaker had been able to see, hear, and describe the cricket, she could 
not recreate the reality of the creature for the reader beyond what is available to her human 
senses (and therefore understanding and language), leading to a frustration of vision and a 
“tautological nightmare,” whereby “description begets only more description” but not the 
animal itself  (Skillman 2016, 213). In order to be responsible to what she cannot know, then, 
Graham creates a presence for this absence—her unknowing of the cricket’s subjective 
being—through the ellipsis.  
 By including the ellipsis, as a “gap” or “fissure,” Graham performs what Susan 
McHugh identifies as a “poststructuralist aesthetic” in contemporary animal-centric poetry 
(2011, 11). This poststructuralist trend emphasises language’s “inadequacies and 
shortcomings” in the face of animal representation as a way of exhibiting its failure to fully 
describe creaturely beings. However, while such “ostentatiously mismanaged” animal 
representations might seek to preserve the enigmatic self-worlds of animals, they can also 
risk creating an even harsher divide between human and animal ways of being (McHugh 
2011, 11). To assume that any representation of animal being is fundamentally impossible is 
to deflect from the necessity of trying to do so. This assumption also prevents us from 
acknowledging what we do already know about creaturely others as sensitive observers, and 
as animals ourselves. It is this apparent conflict between the limits and still-vital importance 
of attempting animal representation that Graham’s poetry attempts to balance.  
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Graham’s early attempts at animal poetry often sidestep representing animals by 
explicitly advertising their rhetorical and metaphorical status within her texts. Her 
intertwining of animal bodies with abstract concepts is particularly evident in her first 
collection, Hybrids of Plants and of Ghosts (1980), in poems such as “One in the Hand” and 
“The Geese” which conflate animal bodies with language itself, or other codes of signs not 
fully available to the speaker’s understanding. In making these poetic objects—animal and 
language—one and the same, Graham interrogates the limits of language by symbolising it 
using an animal figure that is itself the index of language’s failure to fully represent. The final 
poem from this collection, “A Feather for Voltaire,” provides a good example: 
The bird is an alphabet, it flies 
above us, catch 
as catch can  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
And each flight is an arc to buttress the sky,  
a loan to the sky.  
And the little words we make of them, the single feathers, dropped 
for us to recover 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
A feather,  
pulled from the body or found in the snow   
can be dipped into ink   
to make one or more words: possessive, the sun.  
(Graham 1980, 66; ellipses added) 
In this passage, the birds merge with language itself as forms that give shape to our 
experience of the world. Their flight gives the sky a temporary structure—a “buttress”—
creating a shape the mind can grasp against what would otherwise be a vast formlessness, just 
as language gives structure to the formlessness of reality. The shapes we perceive from the 
birds’ flight may not represent the real world, interpreted as they are by humans below—
“catch / as catch can”—but in perceiving the flight, we begin to be able to form our own 
“little words” and “buttress” of language and thought that give names to things in the world 
from the “single feathers” that drop from it. Observing the birds’ flight gives us a shape of the 
world, and we describe this shape using our own, secondary tool for shaping—language—
and, in turn, create our own flights of imagination, interpretation, and representation. 
However symbolic or figurative Graham’s birds are, then, their presence in the text is still 
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predicated upon the existence of the animal being that is beyond our knowing. The birds that 
appear in the poem are read by the interpreting mind, and from the position of the human, but 
their otherness remains untouched while also provoking an awareness in the speaker of her 
own Umwelt that acts to shape her world. Even the most allegorical or symbolic 
representation of animals cannot, therefore, be disentangled from their actuality.  
Following from the inseparability between the figurative and the actual in animal 
representation, Graham directs our attention towards how language also literally depends 
upon the animal body: “A feather … can be dipped into ink / to make one or more words.” 
From this observation we can make further, more sophisticated observations about how 
human language relies upon animal being (including, of course, our own). In his essay “The 
Animal That I Therefore Am (More to Follow),” Derrida describes the relation of human to 
animal as being at once both “I am” and “I follow” (2002, 371–372).  We both are and follow 
animals in many ways: those things that are intrinsic to being human—interpersonal 
communication, abstract thought, emotion, and play—find their precursors (or equivalents) in 
animal behaviours. Symbolic language is no different; it is both continuous with and distinct 
from animal modes of being, having at once developed from animal traits that persist in our 
language10 while also being the single most salient difference between human and nonhuman 
animal being. John Berger elaborates on this point:  
The parallelism of their similar/dissimilar lives allowed animals to provoke 
some of the first questions and offer answers. The first subject matter for 
painting was animal. Probably the first paint was animal blood. Prior to that, it 
is not unreasonable to suppose that the first metaphor was animal … If the first 
metaphor was animal, it was because the essential relation between man and 
animal was metaphoric. Within that relation what the two terms—man and 
animal—shared in common revealed what differentiated them. And vice versa. 
(1992, 7) 
Berger argues that we were only able to establish a concept of human selfhood through initial 
contact with animal others. These animals perceive the human from their own place of 
alterity—a place that causes the human “to become aware” of themselves as individuals, 
                                                             
10 For example, vocalisations that serve as intersubjective communication for the purposes of 
warning other family/group members of threats, to signal the desire for a mate, to find one’s 
parent or child amongst a crowd, or simply to be companionable or in the service of play.  
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“returning the [animal’s] look” (5). According to Berger, then, how we conceive of the 
human intimately depends upon the question posed by the familiar difference of the animal, a 
difference that required metaphor to be approached:   
What distinguished man from animal was the human capacity for symbolic 
thought, the capacity which was inseparable from the development of 
language in which words were not mere signals, but signifiers of something 
other than themselves. Yet the first symbols were animals. What distinguished 
men from animals was born from their relationship with them. (1992, 9) 
Animals and ideas of animality are critical to the development of human metaphor—as can 
be seen in the ubiquity of animal characters and iconography in human stories and art around 
the world. What is absent from both Berger’s theory and Graham’s early poems, however—
both of which focus mostly on the importance of animals and animality to metaphor and self-
understanding—is the lived experience of the animals themselves. In Berger’s expansive 
statements about the role of animality, for example, no specific animal is mentioned. 
Metaphor and analogy may be unavoidable as the very mode we use to understand and 
represent animals, but the portrayals offered by Berger and Graham give little hope that such 
metaphors can ever communicate something about the phenomenal worlds of animals 
themselves without inevitably saying more about how humans perceive the world instead.  
These representations thus become guilty of imagining animals into political or 
aesthetic life “only by bracketing off the significance of embodiment in space and time” 
(McHugh 2011, 11). And so, while unable to be completely removed from the living birds 
that pique the author’s structure-hungry mind, Graham’s birds are still overwhelmingly 
textual objects. They act as visible but impenetrable symbols for the material world and for 
the action of the human mind as it works to understand it. The birds’ flight through Graham’s 
poem might tell us a great deal about human perception, thought, and organisation of reality 
through language, but it can tell us next to nothing about the experience of flight for a bird. 
This is to be expected—after all, Graham makes it very clear that these are figurative animals 
operating more as a metaphor for language than as representations of literal avian beings.  
In Graham’s second collection Erosion (1983) her animal figures become 
disentangled from their explicit doubling as metaphors for the signs of language. She instead 
begins to rely on the cultural connotations of animal figures to express and embody certain 
abstract ideas. Perhaps even more than her earlier poetry that conflates animal bodies and 
linguistic signs (which at least advertise the way language is used to shape her animal 
representation), this later work that favours the poet’s play with allusion over the animal’s 
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own self-world creates an even sharper distinction between the poet as a describing human 
subject and her described animal object. “I Watched a Snake” (1983) supplies a good 
example of this separation.  
In the poem, Graham focuses on how the animal’s body can be read as a “visible 
trace” of the “invisible mechanics”—whether they be hunger, passion, or desire—that guide 
all human and nonhuman action (Smithers 2014). In this case, Graham traces these 
mechanics over a monumental time scale that includes the coming and going of individual 
lives. First, the speaker watches the snake:  
             in the dry grass 
         behind the house 
 catching flies. It kept on  
         disappearing.   
 (Graham 1983, 34) 
Then, she applies a first layer of human abstractions—“lust,” “work”—onto its moving body:  
  And though I know this has  
           something to do  
  
  with lust, today it seemed  
           to have to do  
  with work.  
  (Graham 1983, 34) 
Graham then draws back the poetic frame from a close focus on life in her backyard, where 
the snake catches flies and eyes a butterfly, to muse instead on the passage and progress of 
humanity over history. With this shift in focus, she figures the now-visible, now-invisible 
snake as a metaphor for the “stitching” of human bodies on Earth as they relentlessly appear, 
disappear, and reappear over time:  
  This must be a perfect progress where 
         movement appears  
  to be a vanishing, a mending 
          of the visible 
 
  by the invisible—just as we 
          stitch the earth,  
  it seems to me, each time 
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          we die, going  
  back under, coming back up. . . . 
           It is the simplest  
  stitch, this going where we must,  
           leaving a not  
  unpretty pattern by default. But going 
           out of hunger  
  for small things—flies, words—going 
            because one’s body 
 
  goes.  
  (36–37; original ellipsis) 
Following this passage there is a brief stanza describing the snake with “his tiny hunger” 
(tiny in comparison to the hungers that drive humanity, perhaps) retrieving the “necessary 
blue- / black dragonfly,” before he is removed from the poem completely. This stanza, 
initially, at least, indicates a certain similarity between the human and animal figure with 
their comparable hungers and drives. But then the speaker breaks down the poetic frame she 
has constructed to this point, summarising:  
         All this to say 
  I’m not afraid of them 
          today, or anymore  
  I think. We are not, were not, ever  
          wrong. Desire 
 
  is the honest work of the body 
  (37) 
Deconstructing the poem this way (“All this to say…”), Graham discloses that the snake’s 
presence in the poem is, to a large extent, not about the particularities of his snakely being so 
much as his allegorical import. The snake’s purpose in the poem is mostly to function as an 
object onto which the poet can apply her various personal, historical, and cultural readings.  
The serpent or snake has long served as a subversive and dangerous emblem for many 
of the “invisible mechanics” that drive us, including those Graham names as “desire,” 
“passion,” and “lust.” In Genesis 3, the serpent introduces Eve to her hunger for knowledge 
by encouraging her to eat the forbidden fruit. Once Eve and Adam eat of the fruit, they 
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become self-aware and ashamed of their nakedness, signifying the loss of their innocence and 
the irrevocable separation of the human from nature. 11 In her poem Graham uses the snake, 
with its fragile body (“one that won’t even press / the dandelions down”) and laboured work 
(“It took almost half / an hour to thread / roughly ten feet of lawn, so slow”), to indicate her 
reassessment of desire’s place in and for humanity. For Graham, passion, desire, and lust are 
not things that undo people, but rather give them purpose and meaning over an individual and 
historic timescale:  
                   Passion is work 
            that retrieves us,  
  lost stitches. It makes a pattern of us,  
            it fastens us  
  to sturdier stuff  
            no doubt. 
  (37) 
We can see in this poem that Graham’s animal figures are thus not intended (or, not only 
intended) as depictions of real animal being, but are rather useful stand-ins for other 
immaterial or abstract ideas she wishes to express.  
Graham does, however, become increasingly worried about what might be lost if she 
fails to consider the subjective experiences of animals, and the real-life harm that this kind of 
neglect could effect on their lives and bodies. To see how Graham problematises animal 
representations that remove the experience of the living animal itself, I will now turn to her 
poem “Reading Plato.”  
 “Reading Plato” describes a fly fisherman making and using artificial flies. The 
central animal figure in this poem is not a living being, then, but its human-made copy, 
demonstrating what is absent when the life and subjective world of an animal is bracketed in 
                                                             
11 Derrida associates this first human awareness of nakedness, and first attempt to dress 
oneself, with all following attempts to “clothe” the world in language, culture, and reason. He 
suggests that the humanity’s shame at our nakedness (and at being naked in a way that no 
other animal can be) reveals our even more profound sense of “nakedness” in reality—the 
embarrassment of our separation or “fall” from nature, and our unique need for clothing, 
tools, and language to survive (2002, 373–374).    
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order to create an exact and gratifying (if static) animal representation that the human mind 
can comprehend and enjoy. The poem begins:  
  This is the story 
          of a beautiful  
  lie, what slips 
          through my fingers,  
  your fingers.  
  (Graham 1983, 6) 
On one level, this “story / of a beautiful lie” is about the fishing lure that represents a perfect 
simile of an animal body but which lacks the livingness that defines animal being. On 
another, the lie is the poem itself that (re)creates the story of an event, but which also fails to 
capture its lived reality. Thus, from the opening, we see that both Graham and her character 
are engaged in making forms that, as representations rather than the thing itself, let some of 
its lived reality slip through their grasp. Much of the makers’ need for a faithful mimesis of 
the reality they represent in their “beautiful lies” is simply pragmatic, intended as they are to 
convince the fish/reader to be enticed and bite: 
                    Flies 
       so small 
he works with tweezers and  
        a magnifying glass.  
They must be  
         so believable  
they’re true—feelers,  
           antennae,  
  quick and frantic 
           as something  
   drowning.  
(6) 
There is a point, however, where the idea of the animal and poem begins to overwhelm and 
obscure its living model, and it is the artful crafting of the fisherman instead that becomes 
what is “true”—just as Graham’s poetic retelling of events becomes their “truth” once the 
moment has passed. Thus, the human penchant for abstraction and representation takes 
precedence over the flies’ actual living being (made literal by the fact that these “flies” are of 
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course already a human construction in the poem), with the fisherman reaching towards some 
perfected Platonic form of the concept “Fly.”  
Graham emphasises this connection to Platonic thought through the poem’s title, so 
adding another layer to her filtering of the mundane through philosophical abstraction. Plato 
posited that material objects are only imperfect shadows of their ideal or form: “The world 
that appears to our senses is in some way defective and filled with error, but there is a more 
real and perfect realm, populated by entities (called “forms” or “ideas”) that are eternal, 
changeless, and in some sense paradigmatic for the structure and character of the world 
presented to our senses” (Kraut 2017). In the poem, the lures that the fisherman crafts are 
even more exemplary than the insects they are modelled on. They are a “paradigm” of insect 
being: they cannot change (under their own volition, at least), and they cannot die. Further, 
they are pleasing as useful tools of human skill and labour that can extend the fisherman’s 
horizon of touch and vision—“Past death / past sight”—becoming prosthetics that can 
perform his actions beyond his typical, embodied access. In short, they are a “good idea”:  
                   He makes them 
          out of hair,  
deer hair, because it’s hollow 
          and floats. 
Past death, past sight,  
           this is  
his good idea  
(Graham 1983, 6) 
This “good idea” is not without effect in the material world, however. It is in this stanza that 
Graham begins to enmesh the immaterial forms with their material presence, revealing how 
very contingent Plato’s world of abstracted ideas is upon the world of our senses. The fishing 
fly is not only a representation of a fly and a “good idea,” it is also a material object, and one 
that is made from an animal body: the “deer hair” that is “hollow / and floats.” The properties 
of this hair receive more attention from the fisherman than their source, the animal body, 
which has been “dismembered, remembered,” and only becomes “finally alive” as the lure 
skips over the water’s surface in a movement that echoes the deer’s skipping over land. Thus, 
it is not the deer (or its hair) itself that Graham encourages us to imagine joining the flies 
swarming on the river, but rather our knowledge of this graceful deer:  
  upriver, downriver, imagine, quick 
         in the air,  
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  in flesh, in a blue 
          swarm of  
  flies, our knowledge of  
           the graceful 
  deer skips easily across 
           the surface.  
  (Graham 1983, 7) 
By subdividing the animal body into the properties of its parts, we risk “pulling apart” the 
animal into abstract forms of human knowledge that neglect the unknowable whole from 
which this knowledge came: “Graham’s menagerie of animal visual objects…raise the 
question of what becomes of the irreducible anima not only when it is reconstituted as a 
visual mental representation but when the empirical methods of deriving and organising 
knowledge, necessarily dependent on embodied processes of observation and reason, 
analogously ‘pull apart’ the sentient into the materially ‘true’” (Skillman 2016, 214). 
Forms are powerful because they have real, material effects. The lure is not only an 
immaterial idea; it is an idea that hooks and kills fish. This is an illustration of a larger 
problem: the “ideas” and static representations we create from animals can risk 
deemphasising their subjective experience in service of focusing on their material parts in 
ways that indulge a human lust for knowledge and resources.  
What Graham also suggests, however, is that these abstracted representations are an 
incontrovertible part of how the human mind interacts with the material world of nature. The 
ideas, representations, and stories we tell that reflect and create our world are an innate part 
of how we perceive and learn to understand our place in it—even if that means creating 
beautiful falsehoods, as when Graham describes the sky above the men fishing along the 
riverbed at dawn: “Above / the stars still connect up / their hungry animals” (1983, 7).  
The “beautiful lies” or representations that humans create—as suggested by the name 
Graham gives them—are not necessarily, or only, negative and harmful. The fisherman, in 
his act of making, pays very close and fine attention to the fly that he models with both love 
and art. “His heart / beats wildly / in his hands” (6) as he responds to the unique wonder of 
the insect body. His exacting desire to create the perfect insect body is one of appropriation 
and mastery, perhaps, but it is also one of homage. The fisherman has more interaction with 
the insect and knows more about its relations with other species and its environment than 
those who do not make such models. While the lure cannot re-present the life and subjective 
experience inherent in an insect’s body, the act of its making recognises and respects its being 
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through minute copying and faithful description in an ardent attempt to understand. And, 
perhaps, the poet can perform a homage in the same way.  
Graham herself provides one such homage in her poem “Thinking” from The Errancy 
(1998). This is a poem that, while aware of its reliance upon human systems of understanding 
and representation, also acknowledges the extent to which human knowledge is dependent on 
its interactions with the world and other, nonhuman ways of being.  
“Thinking,” like Wallace Stevens’s “Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird,” 
offers a shifting series of frames for how we could “look” at, or conceive of, an animal other. 
In this case, the animal is a crow who perches above the speaker on a powerline scanning the 
world below him before flying away. Stevens’s poem is a playful attempt to represent the 
mind in action as it interprets or elaborates on the material world. Importantly, Stevens 
acknowledges that, whatever frame one applies, ultimately, “the blackbird is involved / In 
what I know” (n.d.). There is a blackbird, actual or imagined, with which the speaker 
interacts. Perhaps its nature cannot be fully understood, but it exists, and, as the mind works 
against it, the bird becomes co-constructive in the production of the poetic object. Graham’s 
“Thinking” plays with this knowing and unknowing, the presence of the other and the 
observer’s inability to comprehend it fully, as well as the intermingling of the mind’s 
interpretation with reality’s matter, and, finally, the animal’s construction of its own poiesis 
to which the poet is witness.  
Graham’s crow is a textual object. It is a “version of a crow, untitled as such” 
(Graham 1998, 40) that is placed not only between the powerlines and phonelines but also 
amongst the speaker’s lines of sight, thought, and text. Graham’s description is precise, and 
makes her writing “hew so close to its object” that “it forces us to confront the difficulty of 
keeping that mental crow on its mental wire” (Chiasson 2015). This difficulty—of 
description, of capturing the bird in text—makes the crow uncomfortable, so that he hangs 
“like a cough” to his wire (Graham 1998, 40). Perched on this human-made construction that 
is at once the powerline and the line of text, he finds that it does not offer quite enough 
support for the weight of his being:  
  The wire he’s on wobbly and his grip not firm. 
  Lifting each forked clawgrip again and again.  
  Every bit of wind toying with his hive of black balance.  
  Every now and again a passing car underneath causing a quick rearrangement. 
  The phonelines from six houses, and the powerlines from three,  
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  grouped-up above me – some first rung of the sky – him not comfortable,  
  nature silted-in to this maximum habitat – freedom –  
  (Graham 1998, 40) 
In the above passage, the crow’s “freedom” is caught between lines, including the concrete 
lines of the parenthetical dashes that bracket it. This is the sort of freedom afforded to the 
crow in the human-made environment of the poem and in this built-up “maximum habitat” of 
the urban landscape. He is confined by the lines of the static text and by the lines strung—
“some first rung of the sky”—across what would otherwise be his boundless habitat. And yet, 
despite being “not comfortable” in this urban habitat, the crow is not without his own 
knowing and agency. He also contributes and responds to the material environments that 
humans have shaped. Graham gives one example. She observes the crow using the vantage 
point of the powerlines to scan the world below him:  
  Passers-by (woman, dog) vaguely relevant I’d guess though he doesn’t  
             look down,  
  eyeing all round, disqualifying, disqualifying 
  all the bits within radius that hold no clue 
  to whatever is sought, urgent but without hurry 
  (40) 
Although the crow’s environment (and his presence in text) has been profoundly shaped by 
human influence, human knowledge remains unable to predict or control how animals, such 
as the crow, will respond to, take advantage of, and shape those material environments. 
The crow in “Thinking” is thus an unpredictable and incomprehensible presence. The 
speaker sees him “eyeing all around, disqualifying, disqualifying” without being able to 
locate “whatever is sought, urgent but without hurry.” His intention evades her 
understanding, and thus his very presence also bespeaks an absence—a gap or hole in the 
speaker’s knowledge. As Graham grapples with this unknowing, she creates a sequence of 
snapshots in ongoing attempts to somehow frame or make sense of the crow. And yet, while 
the images continue to accumulate around this central absence (her unknowing of the crow), 
the act of seeing itself becomes increasingly insufficient to the task of really perceiving his 
whole:  
                                     All round him air  
dilated, as if my steady glance on him, cindering at the glance-core where  
it held him tightest, swelled and sucked, 
while round that core, first a transition, granular – then the remembrance of 
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                                                                                                     thing being  
seen – remembrance as it thins-out into matter, almost listless – then,  
sorrow – if sorrow could be sterile – and the rest fraying off into all 
                                                                                     the directions, 
variegated amnesias – lawns, black panes, screens the daylight 
thralls into search of well-edged things. . . . 
(40; original ellipsis)  
Here, sight and the air become palpable, and are imbued with a certain animism. Graham 
describes vision precisely—the crow’s black shape against the bright sky causes the air 
around the bird to “swell” and “suck” for the human eye. The crow himself becomes a 
“core,” an irreducible piece, the final indivisible point at the centre of the speaker’s vortex of 
seeing. This core is a nod, too, to the crow’s own “caw” that asserts his existence and 
expression, and whose sense is inaccessible and irreducible to human understanding.  
Towards the end of the poem, Graham moves from a study of how the human speaker 
perceives the crow to an imagining of how the crow himself experiences the world. The 
properties of air that the crow’s body is adapted to, and that he can “read,” become navigable, 
“wired,” and “ridged”:  
      wing-thrash where he at first falls against the powerline 
the updraft seized, gravity winnowed, the falling raggedly 
reversed, depth suddenly pursued, its invisibility ridged – bless him –  
until he is off, hinge by hinge, built of tiny wingtucks, filaments 
of flapped-back wind… 
(40–41) 
Human words and a human sense of craft are used in this passage to describe the crow’s 
flight, but the text is also informed by the crow’s distinct movement and perceived ability to 
study the air. And, like the poet, he creates his own lines—the wires and “filaments” of his 
flight. For Graham’s speaker, thinking the crow leads to crow-like thinking. Graham achieves 
this through defamiliarising tactics of unusual syntax and phrasing, and by creating subjects 
from abstract or immaterial things that make it difficult for the reader to locate who or what is 
acting upon whom. In the above passage, an “updraft” is “seized,” “gravity” is “winnowed,” 
“falling” is “reversed,” and “depth” is “pursued.” This series of abstractions paired with 
unexpected and intent-driven verb forms creates an estranging admixture of material and 
immaterial referents. Using this tactic, Graham imagines the crow’s nonhuman experience of 
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flight, and encourages her readers to themselves imagine the crow’s different-than-human 
sensation of moving through air.   
These final stanzas of the poem—the event of flight, the interaction between human 
and crow, and the poem that is born of it—are co-constructed. Without the crow’s being and 
flight, the speaker’s mind would not be pricked by the otherness of what she encounters. 
Further, her poetic attempts to describe and find “well-edged” meanings for what she has 
experienced would not exist, and the crow would not become a part, through her experiments, 
of what she knows about the world. While the crow is indeed a textual object, he also writes 
his own “sentence of black talk” with his flight. In this sense, the crow is perhaps not so 
much an “other” as a companion: a fellow maker and living being.  
In an interview with Katia Grubisic, Graham remarks: “I am always encouraging my 
students to try and write in the voice of something not human—not that this is a thing that 
one could actually do—but it is a very tonic illusion, a very existentially bracing exercise” 
(Graham 2010). “Thinking” is close to being one such “bracing exercise” through imagining 
the crow’s sensation of flight, if still from a human perspective. It is a poem that foregrounds 
its own textuality while also acknowledging that the crow exists independently from the text. 
Although the poem cannot say, definitively, what it is to be the crow, it can imagine what it 
might be like, and that, simply, might be enough.  
Graham’s poetry from her first collection Hybrids of Plants and of Ghosts to her mid-
career volume The Errancy demonstrates a marked change in her representation of animal 
figures. By the end of this change, describing animal lives for Graham no longer represents 
only the lonely separation of the human mind unable to grasp and understand its object 
through language. It also represents the possibility of expressing wonder at and homage to 
those enigmatic beings of reality that she cannot ever fully know, but which contribute 
nonetheless to her understanding of the world and her place in it. Thus, while Graham cannot 
entirely dissolve the distinction between the human and the various worlds of the animals she 
describes, she can imagine those alternative animal lives through the parameters of her body 
and language—parameters which are not only barriers to understanding but also points of 
contact with the world beyond the self.     
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2. Lispector’s Critical Metaphors: Anthropomorphism and Storying 
Animal Lives 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how Graham represents animals first through acts of 
adynaton that brackets animals’ subjective experience and then through a recognition of 
animal subjectivity that seeks to imagine their self-worlds from within the constraints of 
human-oriented creative expression. Graham’s tactics are certainly not the only possible 
response to the difficulties of animal representation, however. Studying Lispector’s animal-
centric works reveals yet another key literary strategy for how to represent the Umwelten of 
animals in text. In contrast to Graham’s early uncompromising approach, which distances 
animal experience through explicitly figurative representations or through the complete 
disappearance of the animal into the text, Lispector instead draws these animal worlds closer 
to human language and understanding through the trope of anthropomorphism. This 
approach, too, involves certain in-built limits due to its enforcing of a human frame onto the 
self-contained worlds of animals. Nonetheless, anthropomorphism remains an important tool 
for imagining animal lives. Unlike the lapses and absences of adynaton, anthropomorphism at 
least attributes a subjective experience to creaturely beings, and one that, if attuned to the 
animals’ actual conditions of being, can teach us something about the animal world it 
describes.  
Not all instances of anthropomorphism are used with equal respect towards the 
unknowable self-worlds of animal others, however. If Graham’s early writing distances 
animals a little too thoroughly, some of Lispector’s descriptions of animal life (or more 
accurately her characters’ descriptions of animal life) are perhaps overly comfortable 
depicting animal characters in exacting human terms. As I will demonstrate, the risk of these 
humanised accounts that smother the alterity of animal experiences is that they can be used to 
serve human narratives without any meaningful change in the way that those people see or 
treat other animal beings. In this chapter, I will compare two short stories in which Lispector 
employs a naïve and a more sophisticated form of anthropomorphism—“The Buffalo” (“O 
búfalo”) and “A Chicken” (“Uma galinha”)—from her second collection Family Ties (in The 
Complete Stories, 2015; Laços de família, [1960] 1998b). 
In “The Buffalo” (“O búfalo”), Lispector tells of a spurned young woman walking 
through a zoo after being refused by her former lover. In response to her rejection, the woman 
seeks an animal rage to replace her unwanted feelings of love. And, as she moves from cage 
to cage, she “experiments … with her own projection onto the animal” (Ittner 2005, 106), 
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searching for the creature that can show her how to live without tender feelings and 
unburdened by thought. In her passage through the various enclosures, the woman’s 
observations create “an exquisite vignette of animal existence” (Ittner 2005, 106). We meet 
the giraffe—“a virgin with freshly shorn braids,” “that silent wingless bird … more landscape 
than being” (Lispector 2015, 222–223); monkeys who are “happy as weeds”—including a 
female who looks at the woman “with her resigned, loving gaze,” and a male with “his 
emaciated arms outstretched in a crucifix, his bare chest exposed without pride” (223); an 
elephant, “his eyes, with an old man’s benevolence, trapped inside that hulking, inherited 
flesh”; and a camel, “in rags, humpbacked, chewing at himself, absorbed in the process of 
getting to know his food” (224). A coati looks at the woman “with the silence of an inquiring 
body … asking her a question the way a child asks” (226–227); and, finally, she encounters 
the buffalo: “The buffalo with his constricted torso.… he was a body blackened with tranquil 
rage” (230). 
Clearly, Lispector describes these animals with metaphor and allusion that 
superimpose the woman’s own subjective experience onto their bodies. The giraffe is of 
course not a “virgin with freshly shorn braids,” nor is it “a silent wingless bird.” The monkey 
does not outstretch his arms with a Christian idea of crucifixion, nor can the woman know 
that the female monkey is looking at her with love and resignation or that the elephant is 
“benevolent” by nature. These animal descriptions are trifling characterisations compared to 
what the woman projects onto the buffalo, however. To the woman, the buffalo represents the 
object/embodiment of her rage. In front of its powerful body she becomes “nearly absolved” 
(231) of the schism inside herself between her lust to hate and the already-budding 
forgiveness she wishes to resist. The buffalo, for her, provides a startling and refreshing point 
of cathexis for her dissonant feelings.  
Ultimately, this woman’s search centres on the self. She is not interested in the 
animals for their own sake, but as some external object that might teach her how to be 
something other than she is. As Jutta Ittner states, “It is important to know that in this 
powerful story about the impact of the gaze of the Other, the buffalo’s role is assigned by the 
human viewer. What appears to be the animal’s ‘hatred’ is, of course, the woman’s 
projection” (2005, 106). While regrettable in its imposition, to read the animal’s body in this 
anthropomorphising way—that is, to intuit within the animal some kind of human quality on 
the basis of their physical form—may be impossible to avoid altogether. Lispector artfully 
captures the ways in which the woman interprets and relates to the world through 
anthropomorphism, and, in doing so, she exposes the woman’s own Umwelt.  
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The protagonist’s experience is one of solipsism, heightened by her emotional 
distress. She is unable to escape her individual interpretation of the world and its objects, 
including the animals she encounters. However, as readers, we are aware that her experience, 
as it is relayed to us through the free indirect discourse of Lispector’s narration, is not the 
only possible or objective account. It is instead the result of the interaction of the intending 
mind and its object, whose reality is beyond the individual’s intention or construction.  
Lispector’s animal descriptions are carefully ironic, and she chooses to story her 
animal lives in ways that subvert her own character’s preconceived attitudes towards them. 
She begins “The Buffalo” with the word “But” (“Mas”): “But it was Spring. Even the lion 
licked the lioness’s smooth forehead. Both animals blond” (2015, 222). “But” appears twice 
more within the opening paragraph: “‘But this is love, it’s love again,’ railed the woman 
trying to locate her own hatred but it was spring and the two lions had been in love” (222). 
“But” crops up repeatedly throughout the story, where its incessant repetition signals the 
continual rebuff of the woman’s expectations. She has come to the zoo with preconceptions 
about what she will find in the animal kingdom—violence, base instinct, and ruthless 
uncaring—and yet reality is too much and too different for her narrative to persist. She 
repeatedly fails to assign her desired meaning onto the animals’ living bodies: “But the 
giraffe was a virgin”; “But the elephant withstood his own weight”; “But not the camel in 
ragged burlap”; “But where, where to find the animal that would teach her to have her own 
hatred?” (223–227; emphasis added). Using this contrasting conjunction, Lispector indicates 
the refusal of reality to be rendered according to the woman’s predictions.  
The animals, in particular, have a reality that is separate from how the woman reads 
them. They are not only able to be looked at, but can also look back, and, in their own way, 
read the woman. When, filled with a hunger for violence, the woman moves close to the 
monkeys’ cage, she imagines that she will “kill them with fifteen dry bullets … she’d shoot 
the monkey between the eyes, she’d shoot those eyes that were staring at her without 
blinking” (223). Her actual encounter with the monkey proceeds quite differently:  
Suddenly the woman averted her face: because the monkey’s pupils were 
covered with a gelatinous white veil, in his eyes the sweetness of sickness, he 
was an old monkey—the woman averted her face, trapping between her teeth 
a feeling she hadn’t come looking for, she quickened her step, even so, turned 
her head in alarm back toward the monkey with its arms outstretched: he kept 
staring straight ahead. “Oh no, not this,” she thought. And as she fled, she 
said: “God, teach me only how to hate.” (Lispector 2015, 223) 
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The reality of the monkey’s gaze, and his frailty and old age, makes it impossible for the 
woman to maintain her embittered anger against him.  
Lispector also uses this encounter with the monkey to draw attention to the woman’s 
own condition as an embodied, biological being. Looking at the monkey prompts a physical-
emotional response: the unwanted feeling that she “trap[s] between her teeth.” By describing 
the scene in this way, Lispector emphasises the situatedness of the woman—in her body, and 
in her own metaphorical “cages” of outraged feeling, human thought and language, and her 
circumscribed ability to perceive and interpret reality. Like the other animals, Lispector gives 
the woman no proper name. The fragile condition of her own, animal body, too, is exposed 
through direct comparison with the other animals. When we meet the camel “getting to know 
his food,” we learn that “she felt weak and tired, she’d hardly eaten in two days” (Lispector 
2015, 224). When she visits the elephant “inside that hulking, inherited flesh,” she finds 
herself “trapped inside the patience of her inherited flesh” (224). And when observing the 
animals, like the coati, she stands with her forehead “pressed against the bars so firmly that 
for an instant it looked like she was the caged one and a free coati was examining her” (227). 
From this interaction, the woman concludes: “The cage was always on the side she was” 
(227). She is unable to extricate herself from the confines of her senses, emotions, and mental 
representations.  
The woman’s despair at her inability to escape either her feelings or physicality is 
further marked by a brief interlude where she rides a rollercoaster and finds her body at the 
mercy of forces beyond her control:  
But all of a sudden came that lurch of the guts, that halting of a heart caught 
by surprise midair … the deep resentment with which she became mechanical, 
her body automatically joyful … the enormous bewilderment at finding herself 
spasmodically frolicking, they were having their way with her, her pure 
whiteness suddenly exposed. (Lispector 2015, 225) 
Far from a dispassionate surveyor, this is a human body “bewildered” at its fact and hotly 
embarrassed by being exposed—both by the rollercoaster and by the betrayal of her former 
lover. She is a person who is uncontrollably contingent on her physical surroundings and, as 
part of this world, she is also able to be acted upon, rejected, and transgressed.  
The woman’s journey through the zoological gardens is a quest to escape herself, and, 
to an extent, through the buffalo she does. At the end of the story, the woman collapses: 
“before her body gently crumpled the woman saw the whole sky and a buffalo” (231). While 
the buffalo, on a literal level, did not cause the woman’s collapse simply by the force of its 
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overpowering presence, neither was he uninvolved in the woman’s slide into 
unconsciousness. She ascribes to the buffalo a meaning and intention because he physically 
matches (as she perceives him) the thing she seeks: a masculine, primal animality to contrast 
with what she feels is her “fragility” as an “imprisoned female” (228). She displaces her 
painful and conflicted emotions upon him: “I love you, she then said with hatred to the man 
whose great unpunishable crime was not wanting her. I hate you, she said beseeching the 
buffalo’s love” (231). She finds a certain catharsis through facing the animal otherness of the 
buffalo, through which she can confront her ex-lover, and against and in which she can define 
herself. This is of course a projection and tells us very little about the buffalo himself, who 
stays still and unchanging throughout their interaction:  
He approached, the dust rose. The woman waited with her arms hanging 
alongside her coat. Slowly he approached. She didn’t take a single step back. 
Until he reached the railings and stopped there. There stood the buffalo and 
the woman, face to face. She didn’t look at his face, or his mouth, or his horns. 
She looked at him in the eye.  
 And the buffalo’s eyes, his eyes looked her in the eye. And such a deep 
pallor was exchanged that the woman fell into a drowsy torpor. Standing, in a 
deep sleep. Small red eyes were looking at her. The eyes of the buffalo. The 
woman was dazed in surprise, slowly shaking her head. The calm buffalo. 
Slowly the woman was shaking her head, astonished by the hatred with which 
the buffalo, tranquil with hatred, was looking at her. (Lispector 2015, 231) 
The woman is clearly affected by the buffalo, but this psychic drama is the result of her own 
internal conflict rather than a meaningful engagement with the buffalo’s actual being. Her 
buffalo is a product of naïve anthropomorphism, and serves a human narrative. In her 
impression of the other animals, too, she pays no real attention to their lives and needs except 
where their captivity mirrors her own.  
The naïve anthropomorphism demonstrated by the woman in “The Buffalo” is of 
limited use to those who seek to represent animals in ways that apprehend—if not fully 
comprehend—their nonhuman Umwelten, as it tells us nothing about how the animals 
themselves interpret, interact with, and create their own conditions of being in the material 
world.  
We might not be able to escape anthropomorphising animals as a means of 
understanding them. We can, however, attempt to be self-aware of how we use 
anthropomorphism, and recognise that the stories we tell about animals are always partial, 
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and always filtered through human ways of being and knowing. If informed by the animals’ 
own conditions of being, these stories can even serve as useful tools for generating 
hypotheses about animals’ actual experiences (Herman 2018, 5). This process may never 
reveal exactly what it is like to be a given animal, but it can help formulate better-considered 
speculations about animals’ subjective experiences. Provisional forms of anthropomorphism 
have been used for some time in ethology, and have been variously dubbed “critical 
anthropomorphism” (Bunghardt 2007), “biocentric anthropomorphism” (Bekoff 2009; Bekoff 
2013), and “animal-centred anthropomorphism” (de Waal 1999). Unlike naïve 
anthropomorphism that results in simplistic animal caricatures created for the purposes 
(amongst others) of satire, socialising young children through fables and fairy tales, or 
children’s films that show a harmonious and benevolent world of nature through the 
“Bambification” of what are often the violent or indifferent relations of animals to one 
another (de Waal 1999), critical anthropomorphism attempts to be informed by those things 
we can know about an animal’s perception, ecology, and evolutionary history when making 
inferences about their experience.  
For advocates of critical anthropomorphism, the danger is not anthropomorphism 
itself but anthropocentrism; or the failure to attempt to bracket one’s human point of view 
when imagining the self-world of an animal other. What is of course paramount when using 
such analogies is to remain vigilant of the fact that anthropomorphism does not actually 
describe animals’ mental lives, but is instead a heuristic that can be used to develop plausible 
statements about those experiences. Such indefinite explanations might seem insufficient, but 
it is better to afford animals some conscious experience than to be “militantly agnostic” about 
animal awareness and, in doing so, negate the possibility—and responsibility—of attending 
to and imagining the alternative worlds of nonhuman animals (Bekoff 2013, 65).  
 Lispector better approximates this critical approach to anthropomorphism in her short 
story “A Chicken” (“Uma galinha”; 2015). In this second short story, her human and 
nonhuman characters occupy the same environment and their lives and relations are more 
closely intertwined than in “The Buffalo.” “A Chicken” focuses on just one animal, 
describing the escape and capture of a hen intended for a family’s Sunday lunch. When the 
hen is caught and returned to the family home, she lays an egg on the kitchen floor. The 
young daughter interprets this act as the chicken caring for the family, and, now taken with 
her, the father and daughter decide to keep the hen as a pet. For a while, she lives with the 
family, occasionally remembering her great escape, until, as the story concludes, “they killed 
her, ate her and years went by” (Lispector 2015, 130).   
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To describe the chicken, Lispector weaves together multiple frames or ways of seeing 
her to create a multifractal view. No single frame represents a complete image of the hen, and 
none is intended to have more weight than any other. Each frame instead offers a certain 
reading or “truth” about the hen from the standpoints of the history of her species, her 
cultural value, her biological fact, and her significance as an individual living being. 
Avoiding any single, defining description helps Lispector to go some way toward 
overcoming the perspectival nature inherent in any one reading of the chicken: the hen is not 
only a specimen of gallus gallus domesticus, nor only a pet, nor only dinner, but neither is she 
not any of these things. No single definition will suffice, and so Lispector works together the 
many strands of her being.  
The first frame for viewing the hen is introduced in the opening sentence: “She was a 
Sunday chicken” (127). This characterisation of the chicken is a markedly anthropocentric 
one, operating as it does on the conventions of time, day, and custom—the Sunday roast. Yet 
even this sentence indicates more than a one-way relationship of mastery between human and 
animal. The hen’s body might be subject to human custom, but the culture of the Sunday 
roast would also not exist without the bird.  
A second, related framing of the hen simply describes her as “a chicken,” one among 
innumerable others that have been bred to suit human needs. She is so overbred, in fact, that 
when she is chased over the rooftops of the town the separation between her ancestral origins 
and her present, over-cultivated state is made clear:  
Ill-adapted to a wilder struggle for life, the chicken had to decide for herself 
which way to go, without any help from her race….  
… Her sole advantage was that there were so many chickens that whenever 
one died another emerged that very instant as alike as if it were the same. 
(Lispector 2015, 128) 
Lispector is unsentimental in her description, and the hen is not represented as a special, 
individual case. Rather, she is: “neither gentle nor standoffish, neither cheerful nor sad, she 
was nothing, she was a chicken. Which shouldn’t suggest any special feeling” (129).  
However, balancing the narrator’s apparent indifference are moments of real concern 
for the pathetic figure of the hen, who, “without father and mother,” sits on the kitchen floor 
giving her warmth to “a thing that would never be more than an egg” (128). Within the 
story’s plot as well, despite being a very ordinary hen, she does come to hold (for a short time 




The hen’s temporary rise to beloved pet demonstrates the role of storying in human 
interactions with animals. The mother, who deals more intimately with the killing and 
preparation of the bird for family dinners, was simply “tired” and “shrugged” when her 
husband and child vowed never to eat chicken again in their lives (129). Unlike her husband, 
she does not believe (with pretence or otherwise) in her daughter’s fanciful story that the hen 
laid the egg out of love for the family. And it is this naïvely anthropomorphising narrative 
shared by father and daughter that fades into unconcern once the excitement of events has 
passed. 
The mother holds a much more pragmatic view of the hen, its understanding, and 
intentions. She has a more immediate relationship with the bird, both in its life and in its 
death. In this, she exemplifies a relationship with animals that Berger describes:  
Animals came from over the horizon. They belonged there and here. 
Likewise, they were mortal and immortal. An animal’s blood flowed like 
human blood, but its species was undying and each lion was Lion, each ox was 
Ox. This—maybe the first existential dualism—was reflected in the treatment 
of animals. They were subjected and worshipped, bred and sacrificed. Today 
the vestiges of this dualism remain among those who live intimately with, and 
depend upon, animals. A peasant becomes fond of his pig and is happy to salt 
away its pork. What is significant, and is so difficult for the urban stranger to 
understand, is that the two statements in that sentence are connected by an and 
and not by a but. (1992, 6–7) 
Having bought rather than raised the hen—“select[ing] her, feeling up her intimate parts 
indifferently” (Lispector 2015, 127)—the mother is perhaps less attentive to, and fond of, this 
little hen than the “peasant” of Berger’s idyll, but neither is she under any illusion about how 
the roast chicken appears on their dinner table. For the mother, the hen is a member of the 
household and their dinner, while for the father and daughter a “but” dissociates these two 
views.  
Thus far, I have only covered human views of the chicken. “A Chicken” does not 
solely use human frames of reference, however. The chicken herself is given a subjectivity 
and feeling. At times, these are low-level attributions based on what someone could feasibly 
perceive from observing the hen, including statements such as “she, hesitant and trembling, 
was urgently determining a further route” (127). At other times, however, the hen is afforded 
the high-level attributions of memory and emotion, even an emotion so complex as nostalgia: 
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Every once in a while, though increasingly rarely, the chicken would again 
recall the figure she had cut against the air on the edge of the roof, about to 
proclaim herself. That’s when she’d fill her lungs with the kitchen’s sullied air 
and, even if females were given to crowing, wouldn’t crow but would feel 
much happier. (Lispector 2015, 129–130)  
In the space of fiction, this rhetorical representation of the animal’s experience—like the 
story the daughter and father tell themselves—can foster sympathy for the hen’s life and 
wellbeing. However, Lispector’s weaving together of the various ways of seeing the hen 
means that her narrative is more robust, with any single standpoint balanced and kept in 
check by other, contrasting points of view.  
 Lispector further extends her play with point of view by using defamiliarising tactics 
that also work to expose what might be the reader’s own unexamined attitudes towards the 
little hen that she describes. David Herman hypothesises that “literary writing can at once 
draw on and hold up for investigation available frameworks for conceptualising animal 
worlds as well as human-animal interactions” in a bottom-up process that might ultimately 
help shift wider cultural attitudes towards animal beings (2018, 234). His theory hinges on 
storytelling as a means of extending current ideas of what constitutes a “self” so that they 
grow to contain both human and nonhuman subjects in a “bionarratology” that reaches across 
species lines (249). To support his argument, Herman cites the French philosopher and 
hermeneutic phenomenologist Paul Ricœur: “Ricœur follows hermeneutic tradition in linking 
understanding to top-down, pre- or nondeliberative use of available schemes for sense 
making, and explanation to the bottom-up, deliberative modification of those schemes; such 
modification is required when default assumptions about how the world works fail to find 
purchase” (Herman 2018, 234). Herman argues through Ricœur that literature which “holds 
open” the world of the text, and which uses self-reflexive irony and phrasing, can at once 
generate and respond to moments when default assumptions fail to make sense of reality 
(240). Literature, he maintains, can achieve this through a process that Ricœur labels 
“distanciation,” whereby “initially taken-for-granted frameworks of understanding are 
bracketed, reconstructed as targets of explanation, and then reassimilated into (reprocessed 
as) new forms of understanding” (Herman 2018, 235). By applying “distanciation” to animal-
centric literature, Herman proposes that “default assumptions about nonhuman agents and 
human-animal interactions are what come into question—and, in the process make possible 
new ways of orienting to modes of creatural life that extend beyond the human” (235).  
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Before the reader is re-orientated, however, norm-challenging literature must first 
disorientate them. Defamiliarisation is one method that encourages readers to distance 
themselves from their default behaviours and attitudes and to enter instead into a transitory 
state of existential awareness stimulated by an aesthetic experience. Through this 
estrangement, Shklovsky—who developed the concept of ostranenie or “defamiliarisation” in 
his essay “Art, As Device”—argues that defamiliarising art can “restore the sensation of life,” 
and “deautomatise” one’s everyday interaction with the world, “in order to make us feel 
things, in order to make a stone stoney” ([1917] 2015, 162).  
“Deautomatising” the characters’ (and readers’) “everyday interactions” with the little 
hen is exactly what Lispector does in her short story. She estranges the reader from their 
default attitudes toward the chicken and the rituals that surround her body by representing 
them in unorthodox and idiosyncratic ways—as if they were being “seen for the first time” 
(Shklovsky 2015, 163). For example, in “A Chicken,” Lispector defamiliarises the Sunday 
roast by reintroducing it to the reader as absolutely contingent upon the chicken’s flesh—a 
commonly known but rarely felt fact. She estranges the hen herself by describing her external 
appearance with unusual metaphor and by exposing the unseen, fragile organs of her body: 
“She sat on her egg and stayed there, breathing, her eyes buttoning and unbuttoning. Her 
heart, so small on a plate, made her feathers rise and fall” (Lispector 2015, 128). Finally, 
Lispector also holds up for examination the human characters’ reactions to the hen, and, in 
doing so, brings to the readers’ consciousness their own attitudes to the bird that might 
otherwise pass unacknowledged: “The father, the mother and the daughter had been staring 
for quite some time, without thinking anything in particular. No one had ever petted a 
chicken’s head before” (129). By making salient the rarely considered attitudes and practices 
around the chicken’s body and being, Lispector distances the reader from their typical idea of 
the hen, “holding open” the world of text in a way that might “reorient” readers towards the 
animal life described.  
In these passages of “A Chicken” and other animal-centric texts like it, 
defamiliarising tactics re-present the animal so that it can be seen for its specificity, rather 
than as a generic iteration of its species intended to be read in an automatic or generalised 
way. Focusing on the individual animal has ethical implications. The philosopher Kelly 
Oliver insists that it is this kind of fluid “response-ability” to individual animals that is 
missing from systems of animal rights that rely on generalisable and abstract human laws. 
These systems fail, she argues, to achieve meaningful improvement in the lives of animals 
“by addressing the symptoms, but not the structures, of oppression, including material and 
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economic structures” (2009, 31). Oliver concludes: “Rights might be better than nothing, but 
they still leave oppressive power structures and values intact” (31).12 She thus favours 
interactions with, and responses to, the actual living animal individual rather than the 
preposterously large category of beings labelled as “the animal” in philosophical or moral 
questions. In literary texts, defamiliarisation has the potential to create this fluid ethical 
response due to its re- or disorientating tactics that bring its subject/reader into a more 
profound awareness (and imagining) of the described animal.13    
Responsible descriptions focusing on the individual animal, and which operate in a 
rhetorical space of “as if,” may offer a meaningful, non-totalising way of imagining animal 
alterity without using deflecting tactics that reduce animals to absolute others or the objects 
of naïve anthropomorphism. To maintain such a stance for any length of time may be more 
aspirational than practical, however, as this stance requires that writers and readers entirely 
dissociate from the metaphorical, historical, and scientific readings that linger alongside their 
interactions with animals, and which are inhered in language itself. Even approximating this 
defamiliarised “mode of attention” toward the animal is effortful and “difficult to inhabit.” It 
is “impossible to sustain” indefinitely, and advocates for a hypothetical stance of self-
                                                             
12 Oliver’s comments on animal rights are developed from Wendy Brown’s position on 
women’s rights and their basis either on “characteristics specific to feminine or female 
identity and thereby reinforcing a subordinated or abjected identity” on the one hand, or 
“universal characteristics associated with masculine and male identity and thereby continuing 
to devalue femininity and female identity” (30) on the other. This question of whether to base 
rights on “feminine” or “masculine” traits becomes further complicated when considered 
from a place of intersectional feminism that recognises how race, class, sexuality, and 
gender-queer identities affect how individuals are perceived and treated. In short, no concrete 
set of rules has yet reached the same level of response-ability at the level of the individual as 
relations that depend upon a fluid and personalised ethical response.  
13 One must be careful not to place too much trust in the “liberal imagination” to occupy the 
space of oppressed others and to deride the institution of rights too readily, however. As 
Amia Srinivasan states: “Feminists have pushed hard against the idea that the moral 
imagination is as powerful as liberals tend to presume—that oppressors can simply place 
themselves in the shoes of the oppressed—in turn insisting that imaginative representation 
give way to actual political representation” (2018).   
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distancing which “seems to be saying two things: imagine, but also acknowledge the 
impossibility of truly imagining” (Malay 2018, 1). At its very limit, this heightened 
sensitivity can “lead to a breakdown of perspective, an overpowering of self” (1) for the 
subjects and readers of animal-centric texts. Further, bracketing our “human” ways of seeing 
and identifying with the animal’s perspective is not necessarily or always virtuous. Indeed, as 
Michael Malay notes, “identification can be a very dubious aim” as a means of achieving 
ethical response (2018, 21). He argues that one need only look at Ted Hughes’s Crow or the 
paintings of Francis Bacon to know that an affinity for animality can be morally ambiguous 
(136).  
 The literary critic Rita Felski, for her part, questions the assumption that readers or 
spectators of estranging art and poetics will automatically be “enlightened” to the “true” state 
of their world and thus be inspired to take action to correct any previously overlooked 
injustices. She states: “Defamiliarisation of course is not just an aesthetic device but one that 
is invested with an amplitude of political virtues. To attain a newly invigorated perspective 
on everyday life is to be critically enlightened; it is simply taken for granted that 
estrangement will serve the social good” (2002, 610). She argues that people need 
“everyday” or “automatic” responses in order to manage the countless tasks and flow of 
stimuli that they encounter in their daily lives—something we can identify in the mother’s 
“tired” and largely unaffected response to the hen in “A Chicken.” Felski points to Edmund 
Husserl’s concept of “lifeworld,” a term that refers to “all that must remain invisible in order 
that we be able to see, the dense, tangled thicket of preconscious presuppositions that underlie 
our thoughts and actions” (2002, 614). Building on this definition of one’s “lifeworld,” Felski 
adds: “much of the unthought of our thought must remain opaque, recalcitrant and beyond the 
reach of understanding and critique. One’s own form of life is never fully available for 
retrieval and analysis, thanks to the irreducible embeddedness of thought and action, the 
impossibility of turning all of one’s background into foreground” (614–15). That much of 
one’s “form of life is never fully retrievable,” she argues, is not to say that “implicit 
knowledge can never become explicit; clearly, many tacit beliefs do become newly visible 
and open to question, often as a result of the estranging effect of historical change or cross-
cultural encounter” (614). Felski’s bottom line, then, is not that we should let 
unacknowledged and potentially unjust attitudes perpetuate, but that we cannot do away with 
“unexamined” and unconscious processes altogether. It is simply unfeasible for people to 
exist in a state of constant existential awareness—a state that is more likely to result in a 
paralysis of personal agency and decision making than radical political action.  
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While a hypothetical position of constant response-ability and ethical awareness 
towards animal lives would certainly be desirable, humans need tacit structures and codes in 
order to navigate the world without constant cognitive stress. Improving these structures so 
that they best serve a sustainable and respectful way of living with others is less likely to 
depend upon a perpetual state of radical awareness than on recurring periods of 
(re-)negotiation, achieved through renewed attention and care so that the “default” position of 
a social group, and the individuals within it, moves toward better inclusivity and flexibility 
towards those previously considered “other”—both within and across species lines.  
 If we return to Lispector’s “A Chicken,” we can see that after a brief period of intense 
interest the father’s and daughter’s attitude towards the hen reverts back to its previous 
unconcern. In writing characters that demonstrate such inconstant affection, Lispector shows 
both the productive possibilities of estrangement as a way to foster sympathy and awareness 
for another’s life and wellbeing, as well as its tendency to collapse when this newfound 
awareness fails to be integrated into the structures of everyday life. The father’s and 
daughter’s temporary attentiveness to the hen does result in their attributing to her a 
subjective experience—one in which she would lay an egg to let the family know she cares 
for them. However, this narrative is naïve, perhaps even knowingly incorrect, and does not 
result in a continued respect for the hen. The father and daughter also fail to extend this same 
concern to other hens or animals beyond the lone, special chicken they have chosen to 
(temporarily) dote upon. Lispector’s humorous, if sceptical, representation of human-animal 
relations thus suggests the fickle nature of humanity’s concern for animal lives when their 
understanding of animal others is based on shallow, anthropomorphic caricatures that cannot 
be meaningfully incorporated into daily life. The father and daughter impose a narrative upon 
the hen rather than sincerely attend to the specificities of her animal self. Here, Lispector 
places a story within a story, framing their naïvely anthropomorphic story within the wider 
frame of her critically anthropomorphic tale.   
Lispector’s tactics for animal representation, like Graham’s in the previous chapter, 
never fully elide the differences between human and animal ways of being. Lispector does 
create texts, however, that carefully manage how they represent animals by balancing 
estranging and anthropomorphising techniques that foster sympathy for animal others (often 
in ways that are unavailable to the story’s characters themselves) with a realism about how 
these frames of understanding are limited by their human point of view. She is also realistic 
about the unlikelihood of defamiliarising tactics can effecting lasting change unless the 
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attention that they stimulate is integrated into people’s everyday understanding of, and 
relations with, other animals.  
In this first movement, I have demonstrated how Graham and Lispector approach 
animal representation in ways that do not foreclose the possibility of imagining animal 
experience while still respecting the alterity of those animals’ being through the tropes of 
adynaton and anthropomorphism. I have also demonstrated how both authors use 
defamiliarising descriptions to encourage readers to briefly suspend their default ways of 
understanding the world, and to imagine the point of view of an animal other—with a 
recognition, in Graham’s case, that this does not necessarily reveal what it is like to actually 
be that animal, and, in Lispector’s case, that the awareness this estrangement provokes does 
not always assure a long lasting, systemic change in how animals are perceived and treated 
by their human counterparts.   
In looking at these authors, I have illustrated some of the challenges that writers 
encounter when attempting to represent animal lives. I have also shown how these challenges 
have, in turn, affected Graham’s and Lispector’s works so that they have come to develop 
richer, more nuanced approaches to animal representation. In the second movement of this 
thesis, I will argue that this increased attention towards animals and animality influences not 
only how the authors perceive nonhuman animals, but also affects how they conceive of and 




Second Movement: Becoming-Animal 
1. Graham and the Impersonal Biology of the Self 
Graham is infamous for her persistent probing of the indistinct divide between the material 
and the immaterial in her poetry (Vendler 1995; Vendler 2003). Her interest in testing the 
enigmatic limits between material bodies and immaterial minds, in particular, extends not 
only to testing the limit between the human and the animal—as I demonstrated in the first 
movement of this thesis—but also to questioning where this divide occurs within the human. 
Where, or at what point, does our material and animal body separate from what we 
experience as the thinking human self?  
Through her interrogation of what it is to be a human animal, Graham grows 
particularly concerned about what might be lost if we consider the human to be a creature 
whose thoughts, emotions, and sense of self are wholly dependent upon impersonal biological 
processes. These poetic investigations lead Graham to question whether the nature of the 
material body resides in “its ecstatic livingness or its cold otherness”? (Vendler 1995, 105). 
In other words, is our animal body a “world opening” (Bartosch 2017, 46) that enables our 
sensation and experience of reality and that provides us with the opportunity to participate in 
the world? Or is the animal body instead that which restricts and defines our perception and 
understanding of the world, limiting what would otherwise be the boundless access of an 
immaterial mind?  
As a lyric poet, Graham also explores how the limitations of the material body place 
stress on the lyric subject’s power of description (Skillman 2016, 14). From a biological 
standpoint, it cannot be assumed that what the lyric subject describes is a universally shared, 
objective, and true depiction of events; it is instead a depiction limited by the subject’s point 
of view, and the allowances of their animal body. Further, beyond the question of whether the 
human subject can see and describe the world as it really is, Graham is fascinated and deeply 
concerned by what a materialist understanding of the self means for the human individual’s 
sense of agency and personal responsibility. Apprehending that there is more to be lost than a 
sovereign selfhood with unerring vision, Graham worries about the dangers of a materialist 
understanding of human consciousness and behaviour—behaviour that we prefer to think of 
as freely chosen rather than defined, even dictated, by biological mechanisms.  
In this chapter, I will first analyse a number of poems where Graham detects the 
inherent limitations and capabilities of the human body through comparison with animal 
others. I will then turn to the poem “Dawn Day One” (2004), which describes the “sacrifice” 
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of a monkey in a cognitive sciences experiment aimed at advancing understanding of the 
human visual system. On the one hand, this monkey provides a close analogy to the human 
eye, helping human scientists to better understand how we engage with and understand our 
world. On the other, Graham provides us with a chilling example of what seems intuitively 
wrong about seeing human and animal bodies as cold machines—particularly when the 
unique subjective experience of these beings is overlooked. A strengthened belief in the 
inviolable nature of the self emerges in this poem and comes to influence how Graham writes 
about human and animal subjects in her later career.  
Sight is the first sense through which Graham intuits and investigates the 
consequences of her material animal body. What Catherine Sona Karagueuzian calls 
Graham’s “frustration with the limits of sight” (2005, 44) is perhaps the most commented-on 
aspect of her poetry. Another critic, Willard Spiegelman, states that “regardless of the 
genuine, wrenching, and dramatic changes that she has made in her books—correcting, 
undoing, and revising earlier work—one element remains constant: her visual delight in the 
world is matched by an opposing resistance to the visible” (2007, 176–77). He notes that 
Graham’s seeing is in fact always bracketed, stating: “Graham does not see: if she did, she 
would have clear direct objects of vision. Instead, she must look at, toward, above all, 
through. ‘To look’ is never a transitive verb, no matter how much one wants it to be. The 
prepositions make a frame” (187–88). Most literally, what Graham must look through to 
frame her objects is the physical, animal organ of her eye.  
The failures of Graham’s language in her early poetry thus come to reflect failures of 
sight itself so that her increasingly fragmented and disorientating descriptions render the 
poetic objects “hard to see” (Spiegelman, 2007, 187)—a characteristic that reached its peak 
in her collection Swarm (2000). These descriptions that obscure just as much as they reveal 
dramatise Graham’s concerns about what any single, embodied point of view might miss of 
reality. Consequently, she also worries about what might be neglected from the theories and 
frameworks used to represent and model this reality when they are based on biologically-
limited, human sight. In particular, Graham worries about the harm that unacknowledged 
gaps or biases in our perception might cause on a planet that has become shaped and 
dominated by human representations, theories, and models. As a result, Graham’s poetry 
demonstrates a discomfort with straightforward descriptions that naturalise her point of view, 
and that might suggest that she is able to describe her objects as they really are rather than 
how she perceives them to be.   
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One way she problematises her descriptions is by clinically analysing the biological 
mechanisms of sight. In writing about this typically inconspicuous process, she makes it an 
explicit part of what defines her speakers’ sensory and poetic acts. Her poem “Salmon” 
(1983), for example, compares the flow of perceptual data through the eye to the instinct-
driven journey that salmon make upstream: 
  not even hungry, not even endangered, driving deeper and deeper 
  into less. They leapt up falls, ladders,  
  and rock, tearing and leaping, a gold river  
  and a blue river traveling 
  in opposite directions.  
  They would not stop, resolution of will 
  and helplessness, as the eye  
  is helpless  
  when the image forms itself, upside-down, backward,  
  driving up into  
  the mind, and the world 
  unfastens itself  
  from the deep ocean of the given. . . . Justice, aspen  
  leaves, mother attempting  
  suicide, the white night-flying moth 
  the ants dismantled bit by bit and carried in  
  right through the crack  
  in my wall. . . . How helpless 
  the still pool is,  
  upstream,  
  awaiting the gold blade  
  of their hurry.  
   (Graham 1983, 40; original ellipses) 
In this passage, visual data from the real world (“the deep pool of the given”)—tree leaves, 
the remembered sight of a mother’s attempted suicide, and her watching of the pulled-apart 
body of a white moth being carried away by ants—travels into the smaller, “still pool” of the 
mind. Graham exhibits a scientific understanding how the eye captures the stuff of reality: 
how the convex lens of the eye refracts light to flip the received image so that it hits the retina 
“upside-down, backwards,” ready to be carried on via the optic nerves and translated into 
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what she sees by the brain. This process is unconscious and unable to be controlled (it is 
“helpless”), and it is often only when it fails that one has any sense of it taking place at all.14 
Vision feels immediate, automatic, and as if it occurs free of any instrument; it feels as 
though what we see is true. Graham diminishes this truth by comparing it to the salmon’s 
own undeniable and instinctive truth that guides it upstream and ultimately to its death; she 
suggests that we are just as helpless to control what we see, and what we feel is real, as the 
salmon is helpless to resist its biological dictum to run from ocean to gravel bed.  
 Graham does not accept this restricted vision (one which is biologically-mediated and 
fallible) without a sense of loss and grief, however, and we can feel her longing for an 
unobstructed view of the world in a later poem “The Guardian Angel of Point-of-View” 
(1998). This poem, like “Salmon,” also makes apparent the mechanisms of sight, but further 
personifies them so that their hunger to see all—without the framing of the biological eye or 
the construction of the mind—becomes palpable:  
  Oh to taste the limits of the single aperture.  
  To have that beam burn from one’s head –  
  the snapping of a retina – no errancy –  
  and starched, voracious – (plunder without narration) –  
  this view the very drink for whom these drinkers are  
  created, these distances uniquely meant to thread their narrow hurt – 
  the browsing mind encountering the filament of point-of-view 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
starving emptiness at the core of the long corridor  
                    coming awake – individuating –  
first blood-shot down its inner lengths,  
then flat, clean, quick, gusting with the suctions of  
                                              the possible –  
oh anything – let them wake up, therefore,  
discalced, refined – meandering supplicants  
seeking a tyrant or a tyranny that won’t reveal itself,  
                                                             
14 See “To a Friend Going Blind” (Graham 1983, 27) for a poem that indirectly addresses 
how it is only when our sight begins to fail that we begin to apprehend “the in-built limits” of 
our perception.  
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nearly-shy first-glancings a little advance cavalcade,  
then coalescing, sensing the something that is 
                missing here – beside? inside? –  
beings so full of second-thought,  
overwakeful, blurry with anticipation and hurry  
and the sense, always, of something being stolen –  
(Graham 1998, 78–80; ellipsis added) 
Graham makes sight material, animated, and full of intent: the retina becomes the “single 
aperture” that leads light along the “long corridor” of the optic nerve, and seeing becomes a 
“cavalcade” of “glancings” that shuttle along its path in fevered looking (and looking again) 
to see the “tyrant” of reality that “won’t reveal itself” to the humbled and barefooted 
(“discalced”) supplicants entirely devoted to gazing upon it. At this mid-point in her career, 
Graham only feels this loss of a clear object of sight as an individual. She is “so full of 
second-thought” as she tries to shape the visual cues she receives into an image of reality. 
She does not yet extend beyond the self to think about how these gaps in perception might 
affect other beings in the world.  
Thus, while Graham’s poetry has long been known for its frustrated vision—or the 
biological particularities of her Umwelt that refuse total knowledge of the objective world—it 
is only after what Nikki Skillman calls “the cognitive revolution” (2016, 4) that Graham’s 
investigation of the potentially disastrous consequences of human experience being entirely 
explained by material processes becomes particularly urgent. This “revolution” refers to 
society’s new deference towards cognitive sciences’ ability to describe and explain human 
consciousness. Consciousness is notoriously difficult to define, but it can loosely be thought 
of as an assemblage of mental processes that include the ability to think, feel, remember, and 
imagine, as well as an awareness of one’s own selfhood as a unified entity moving through 
time and space.15 While cognitive studies have yet to resolve this key question of how to 
define consciousness, and many others beside, they presuppose that we will ultimately be 
able to correlate all mental phenomena—including our overarching sense of self—to 
                                                             
15 For a psychological definition of consciousness, see the APA Dictionary of Psychology 
entry for “consciousness” (American Psychology Association n.d.); For an overview of the 
various attempts to define consciousness in philosophy, see the entry for “Consciousness” in 
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Van Gulick 2018).  
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underlying neurological (i.e. material) processes. That is, cognitive sciences assume that 
everything psychological is also biological, and that it is our body—with its intricate systems 
of sense organs, electrochemical messages, and neural pathways—which determines both our 
perception of the world as well as our most intimate, personal experiences.   
We often find it easier to imagine a biologically constrained perspective on the world 
when looking at other animals. We might ask, for example, as Michel de Montaigne did in 
the sixteenth century and Jacques Derrida did at the end of the last, what understanding does 
a little cat have of herself and her surroundings (de Montaigne [1576] 1877; Derrida [1997] 
2002)? Our answer is usually to assume that it is not an objective understanding, but one that 
is attuned to her specific needs and morphology. When it comes to applying the same 
question to ourselves, as humans, however, we are much less inclined to come to the same 
conclusion about how we perceive the world; not as “metaphysical entities,” but as individual 
beings contingent upon the functioning of biological processes (Metzinger 2003).  
Indeed, Graham often relies on animal figures and their similarity/difference of 
consciousness and perception to feel the limits of her own human consciousness and 
perception. In some cases, this results in poetry about an apprehended failure to perceive the 
world in the same way as the animal she describes, including her own poetic cat who “does 
not mistake the world, / eyeing the spots where the birds must eventually land” (Graham 
1998, 109). At other times, this involves an explicit failure to accurately perceive the animal 
itself. In “Subjectivity,” Graham’s speaker scoops up the unmoving body of a monarch 
butterfly from the footpath on a cold morning intending to press its “2 inches of body and 5 
inches of wing” between two dictionaries (1993, 31). Only when a visiting neighbour informs 
her that the butterfly is not dead, but simply needs the sun to warm its body, does the speaker 
realise how close she was to flattening a living animal (ironically, between books of words) 
in her desire to have a beautiful object to look at. Placed on the lawn, the butterfly (“the 
yellow thing, the specimen”) rises “up out of its envelope of glances— / a bit of fact in the 
light and then just light” (1993, 31).  
This poem does more than capture an abrupt moment of awareness about the danger 
that the speaker poses to the butterfly by attending only to its status as a beautiful object 
rather than as a living subject, however. Graham also swaps positions with the butterfly to 
imagine what it would be like “if being an object and being a subject were equally sentient 
conditions, and one could undergo the process of becoming, rather than forming, a mental 
image” (Skillman 2016, 217). There is an interlude in the middle of the poem in which the 
observing first-person speaker becomes an observed third-person “she” under the felt gaze of 
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a beam of light falling across her body. In this passage, she pictures what it would feel like if 
she herself were intelligently observed by an inquiring mind (Graham 1993, 26–29). In the 
context of her interaction with the butterfly, then, Graham is able to explore a number of 
angles on what it is to be an embodied animal being: she is able to sense the limits of her own 
perception and interpretation of the world, more closely consider the life and self-world of 
another animal, and, further, imagine her own being-in-the-world as if she were being 
observed in the same way that she observes the insect.  
Graham extends this exploration in her later poem “Dawn Day One” (2004), 
performing a lengthy investigation into the implications of understanding the human 
experience as subject to the same biological limitations as other species. The poem begins 
with an awakening into the body:  
 A gunshot. The second, but the first I heard.  
  Then the walls of the room, streaked with first light,  
  shot into place. Then, only then, did my eyes open.  
  We come about first, into waking, as an us, I  
  think. Sometime between the first and second instant  
  there is still the current that carries one in  
  and deposits one in singleness. The body’s weight is  
  a beaching. Back behind, or underneath: infinity 
  or something which has no consequence. Then consequence, which 
  feels like walls and the uprighting of self one has to do 
  in them, then the step one has to take once roused, and how it  
  puts one back on the walking-path one stepped off of  
  last night. 
 (Graham 2004, 30) 
From unconsciousness—and the unregistered gunshot and walls that “shot into place” 
without her witnessing—she wakes, and is “beached” in the body and into the “singleness” of 
the self.  
Now awake and conscious, Graham’s speaker engages in a close and defamiliarising 
focus upon the physical specificities of her body—in particular, the eyes—first reaching 
outside the containment of the poem to directly address the reader and draw them into this 
uncanny self-separation: 
Are your eyes shut? I put cream on my lids 
and rub it in. I feel my eyes in there under the skin.  
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How impersonal they are, these hardnesses, barely  
attached, in their loosely protected sacks.  
(2004, 30) 
The disquieting sense of “me, but not me” that the speaker experiences when feeling her own 
eyes under their lids foreshadows her later exploration of the same strange division that 
occurs when cognitive scientists coolly make human consciousness an object of study. But 
first she explores this at the individual level by feeling her eyes, at once indivisible and 
separate from her.  
The speaker’s eyes enable her to see and respond to the world, but without her 
(conscious self) having any explicit control over the workings of their vision. She can only 
see what these eyes allow her to see with their specific biological parameters, and they are 
“impersonal”—both physical and metaphorical “hardnesses.” Skillman notes in her reading 
of the poem that, “in their total alienness as objectified organs, the eyes become—in a way 
that makes Graham bristle—stripped of intention and thus accountability” (2016, 223). 
Graham relies, as all humans must, on her sense organs and on the brain’s rendering of their 
data to provide her with her sense of reality. And all of these, too, are “impersonal” workings.  
In 2003, Graham joined neuroscientist Antonio Damasio and philosopher Thomas 
Metzinger for a panel discussion on “Emotion, Cognition, and Consciousness” hosted by 
National Public Radio. As an eliminative materialist, Metzinger argues that there is no such 
thing as a “self,” that “what exists are ‘self models’” (2003). That is, what we intuit to be the 
self is simply and finally the result of specific patterns of neurons firing in the brain and does 
not correspond to anything that we could call a discrete and unified selfhood. He summarises 
his position in the discussion:  
We are much more processes than things … and, if we start to think about 
these issues, it becomes clear that the contribution that, for instance, 
neuroscience currently makes to our self-understanding has great cultural 
ramifications too, because we depart from an image of man that has been very 
dear to us for many centuries. (Metzinger 2003) 
This “image of man,” one which believes in the reality of the self as that which distinguishes 
“human” consciousness and autonomy from the automatic or “animal” processes of life that 
support it, has had undeniably negative consequences in the past. Violence both between 
groups of humans and by humans towards other animals has, in part, been due to a belief in a 
sovereign selfhood and the related belief that these “others” do not have the same refined 
consciousness and understanding that the aggressing group perceives within themselves. We 
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can take the “civilising mission” of imperial colonisers as just one example. Or, in the 
geopolitical context that “Dawn Day One” was written in, “the denigration and exploitation 
of various groups of people, from Playboy bunnies to prisoners at Abu Ghraib who were 
treated like dogs as a matter of explicit military policy” (Oliver 2009, 38).  
Recognising that all human and nonhuman animal experience has a material basis can 
lessen a self-aggrandising belief in sovereign selfhood. Cary Wolfe, a posthumanist scholar, 
argues that a materialist understanding of human being is fundamental to moving beyond 
outdated notions of human exceptionalism, explaining that “posthumanism in my sense isn’t 
posthuman at all—in the sense of being ‘after’ our embodiment has been transcended—but is 
only posthumanist, in the sense that it opposes the fantasies of disembodiment and autonomy, 
inherited from humanism itself” (2010, xv). To see the human as a biological being is to 
acknowledge the continuity between human and nonhuman animal ways of being: all animal 
beings sense and respond to the world through material bodies, and these bodies determine 
what types of experiences and responses can be had. It follows, then, that rather than human 
consciousness being a phenomenon entirely separate from other animals’ phenomenal 
experience of the world, we can anticipate—to differing degrees—that these animal 
subjectivities arise from relatively similar material processes to that of the human.  
Severe consequences also follow, however, from dissolving the coherent human self 
into an assemblage of impersonal material mechanisms, as Graham explains in her response 
to Metzinger’s comments:  
I don’t think that the constructed voice of any poet…is naïve in the sense that 
it doesn’t know it’s a construction, but it is concerned with creating a system 
which will allow a person to feel empathy and to undergo accountability. You 
know, we might not be here, really, but we really are killing people…. You 
could probably prove to me that I’m a creature, a total creature of 
circumstance, but unfortunately I’m also a creature that has to cast a vote, I’m 
a person who has to be a mother, I’m a person who has to take care of 
someone in an emergency…. Maybe we have to have selves and be too simple 
and naïve because, if we give up on that, there is something horrifying about 
the degree to which we might slip out from under the mantle of accountability. 
(Graham 2003) 
To believe in biological determinism—that our behaviour is exclusively dependent upon the 
interactions of our biological systems as “creatures” and our environment—is to potentially 
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remove a vast amount of responsibility and ownership for those behaviours from the human 
individual.  
Shunning our moral responsibilities in this way can also exert a direct impact on 
others, including nonhuman animals—particularly if we fail to properly attend to, and 
imagine, the difference and value of their own subjective being. A commonly exploited 
consequence of a shared material basis between all animal beings is that we can look to other 
nonhuman animals to better understand our own sensory systems, brain, and therefore 
consciousness. For example, using animals as subjects in cognitive science studies in order to 
learn more about our human bodies (as Graham describes in “Dawn Day One”) is an instance 
of what Oliver calls “animal pedagogy”; or, “using animals, the animal, and animality to 
teach us about men, the human, and humanity” (2009, 8). Oliver outlines two alternative 
views of the human-animal relationship: “metaphysical separationism” and “biological 
continuism” (8–9). Metaphysical separationism is “the position that humans and animals are 
fundamentally different types of beings whose similarities are superficial at best or 
anthropomorphisms at worst” (9). Biological continuism, which better corroborates with the 
materialist belief at the heart of fields like cognitive sciences and comparative psychology, is 
“the position that humans and animals are fundamentally the same, that their differences are 
no more than degrees of the same kinds of things, whether it is consciousness, emotions, 
pain, or linguistic systems” (8–9). In either case, however, the livingness and unique Umwelt 
of the animal itself is secondary to whether it is distinct from (making the human “superior”), 
or continuous with, the human (and therefore able to be analysed to provide insight into our 
own biological, emotional, or communicative systems).  
One of the ways scientific models mishandle or neglect animal lives is by attempting 
to create a static image or model of the animal that these scientists can use to analyse and 
develop new theories. Even if we agree that animal consciousness is dependent upon the 
material body, this does not mean that this consciousness is stationery and concrete. To take a 
single snapshot from the ongoing flow of impulses and responses that contribute to life and 
one’s experience of living is to represent a deadened object, not the living being itself. To live 
is a process in motion, not a finite, graspable thing, and any attempt to create a static 
representation of life (or the sensation of living) in a single, definite instant falls short of 
capturing the complex, shifting, and transitive relationality of the whole. What happens 
instead is that the living body’s actions are made falsely concrete in order to be described and 
understood. This desire to see objectively is the same desire that Graham describes in her 
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poetry as a “thirst” for something stable, accurate, comprehensible, and true—the “desire for 
a stillness that truly un- /folds” (Graham 1998, 78).  
In “Dawn Day One,” Graham traces how—just as her drive to see and describe the 
“real” world is limited at the level of the lyric subject—the collective work of science, too, is 
shaped and defined by our capabilities and biases as embodied, and, therefore, perspectival, 
human beings. She uses a textbook animal study to make her case: 
Tony tells me how, in the lab, they cast an image 
—a cross in this case—onto the gaze of a monkey then  
                                                                       “sacrifice 
the monkey” and how, when examined, the visual cortex, at the level of  
neurons, actually forms the imprint of  
the cross. It would have been, the cross, (except under very 
                                           unusual circumstances) erased 
by the next image. Hence the need for  
sacrifice. Of what is it made I ask. Of cells, of active  
cells, he says. It is imprinted, I ask. No. It 
would have disappeared and been replaced except 
the creature was stilled. I like it they 
use the word stilled. Then the back  
of the cave in there with its cross of cells. Which will 
dissolve as the “next instant.”  
(Graham 2004, 30) 
Graham takes note of the nature of visual perception that this study reveals. For humans and 
monkeys alike, the first stages of visual processing, past the retina, take place at the back of 
the brain in the occipital lobe. Graham again creates a parallel between this fact and Plato’s 
philosophy: the image “cast” to the “back of the cave” of the monkey’s brain is compared to 
those images perceived by the prisoners in Plato’s allegory of the cave—images which are 
not the ideal and true forms of the objects themselves, but merely the shadows of those 
objects cast upon the wall in front of them. What Graham suggests, then, is that what the 
monkey perceives is an imperfect rendering of the cross, one filtered through the body’s 
organs and the patterning of the brain’s firing cells that “tell” the monkey that this is a cross, 
but which is not the cross itself. This second “cross” made of “active cells” seems material—
it can be photographed, pointed to, and examined—but the concrete image gives a false sense 
of its substantiality. The cross is not “imprinted,” nor can it be touched or held. The neurons 
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themselves are material, and the electrochemical processes that cause these cells to fire rely 
on material structures, but the representation of the cross is not constructed from the cells 
themselves. It is made of the action of those living cells abruptly stopped in what would 
normally have been the passing of an ephemeral moment within an ongoing stream of further 
actions. Graham uses scare quotes around the word “instant” to indicate that there are no such 
moments of absolute stillness in nature; that the truth of consciousness is not in a series of 
still images extracted through the sacrifice of a living being, but in the action and movement 
that is its living. In the search for an objective understanding of how the human sees the 
world (through the proxy of the monkey), the value of the animal’s subjectivity (as a monkey, 
and as that particular monkey) is overlooked and, ultimately, destroyed. That the scientists 
avoid responsibility for this death is indicated by their unsettling euphemism “stilled” that 
evades a deeper consideration of the reality that they have, in actual fact, killed this monkey.   
 Moving from this particular study to a wider view of scientific practices, Graham 
demonstrates how reasoning built upon these snapshot “instances”—the representations and 
models that provide the scaffolding of science—can become hollow and impotent when they 
fail to take into account those things which cannot be schematised or quantified due to their 
invisible or immaterial nature (for example, the subjective self-world of the human and 
nonhuman animals they study). The search for the material basis of immaterial things, such as 
life and “the self,” moves deeper and further, subdividing matter into ever more infinitesimal 
pieces in a process that Graham suggests is a form of maddening “sadness”: 
     “Therefore” is another way to walk, 
  therefore the fast Achilles can never best the slow  
  tortoise. Zeno inferred yet another way.  
  And yes, now space and time can be subdivided  
  infinitely many times. But isn’t this sad?  
  By now hasn’t sadness crept in? 
  (Graham 2004, 30) 
Graham suggests that there is no end point to the probing of the human mind. We can 
subdivide “space and time…infinitely many times” but all this will lead to is a certain 
desperation. With this shift in tone from a material-objective reading of the world to an 
emotional one, Graham also reintroduces emotion as something that is fundamental to our 
experience of the world but which is typically left out of rational explanations of our 
consciousness and phenomenal experience of being. Each of our models can only provide an 
angle or a point of view on their object—an abstracted (and often greatly simplified) 
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representation—and they cannot describe all in a truly omniscient and inclusive “theory of 
everything.” We can move deeper and deeper into the brain in a forensic investigation of how 
each neuron responds to every given stimulus, but such granular study has not, so far, brought 
us closer to understanding on a global level what consciousness is, how it inheres in the flesh, 
and why we experience our sensation of self in the way we do.  
The inbuilt limitations of such models are especially apparent in the study of the mind 
and consciousness, as we are only able to study these things from within the mind and 
consciousness. There is no “outside” from which to analyse the activity of our sensation and 
understanding. Graham likens this dilemma of science to Zeno of Elea’s (c. 490–430 B.C.E) 
paradoxes of motion that “problematise the application of quantitative concepts to physical 
bodies and spatial expanses as ordinarily conceived,” and which may have originated as 
responses to, or even parodies of, “Pythagorean efforts to apply mathematical notions to the 
natural world” (Palmer 2017):  
                    The paradox says that you can never leave  
the room in which you are right now. First walk  
half the distance to the door, then half again, and so on. These eyes,  
under my hands, I looked at in the mirror yesterday.  
Everything of course was silver, my skin, my gaze,  
and then the eyes, held in  
                         their lids.  
Looked everywhere, all the way to the back, here to the front, there is 
no further I can go. One takes smaller and smaller steps 
according to Zeno to try to leave the room. If you return now 
to the glass, you can look at your eyes. After a short  
time, very short if you hold fast, don’t blink, just stare,  
you will be looking at an other. A silver one. I promise 
you, go do it now, you will see it, it is not you.  
It is more exactly not-you than any one you’ve ever seen.  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Before Zeno there was Pythagoras. Before Pythagoras humans  
did not understand—that was the verb that is used—that results  
had to be proved. That there is an edifice  
you can build, level upon level, from first principles,  
using axioms, using logic. Finally you have a house  
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which houses you. Now look at you.  
Are you an entire system of logic and truth?  
Are you a pathway with no body ever really on it?  
Are you shatterable if you took your fist now to  
this face that looks at you as you hold your stare? 
(Graham 2004, 30; ellipsis added) 
Zeno’s paradox of “The Stadium” posits that movement is impossible. It states that, in order 
to move from point A to point B, one must first pass through the midpoint between them; 
and, between the starting position A and this midpoint there will be yet another midpoint; and 
so on, ad infinitum. On the premise that “there is always another half way point that must be 
reached before reaching any given half way point,” Zeno’s paradox argues that, with an 
infinite number of midpoints to be passed through in a finite period of time, movement 
should be impossible (Palmer 2017). Graham likens this paradox to scientific methods to 
suggest that by studying objects at a more and more minute level, and always halving the 
distance, no movement or discovery can be made: “Zeno reasoned we would / never get 
there. Reason in fact never gets there” (Graham 2004, 30). She finds a particular equivalence 
between Zeno’s paradox and the study of the mind where each push forward leads deeper 
into the brain, and to an even more exhaustive description than before —the “smaller and 
smaller steps”— but which nonetheless remain unable to move beyond “the room” of the 
brain/mind in which the investigation is taking place.  
Graham then returns to the uncanniness of the mind studying itself as the roles of 
subject and object become blurred, turning again to the sense—vision—that her delighted and 
troubled engagement with the world is most predicated upon: “you can look at your eyes.” 
The mirror provides a representation of the subject, which becomes an object of its own gaze. 
The “I” becomes an “it” (the eye itself): “you will be looking at an other.” And this “it” will 
be “more exactly not-you than any one you’ve ever seen.”  
The other “you” mirrored back to the viewer in the context of the poem is multi-
layered. At one level, the mirror self is the lyric subject, a composite of the “I” expressing 
and the “it” of this expression made concrete on the page. The lyric subject has had a long 
history in human attempts to understand and describe the sensation of being in the world. As 
such, the mirror of the text offers a poetic object, or “mirror,” for contemplating what it is to 
be a person. This representation of selfhood, however, is not the actual self. On another level, 
the mirror self is the highly-detailed image of the human that science offers. This reflection 
tells us a great deal about what we are, but cannot feel, see, or experience anything itself. 
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Graham therefore cautions against taking this representation of life for life itself and against 
believing its imitation to be a true description of one’s actual being and, in the process, 
mistakenly assuming that the living person is as two-dimensional and “shatterable” as their 
reflected image.  
As Zeno demonstrates, one can build a “system of logic and truth” and still come to 
an errant conclusion. We can create a representation of self and being that follows established 
axioms and principles and which still misses the animal livingness or the distinct “self-world” 
of what we study—whether it be that of the monkey or of the human. We can even follow 
this logic to its “rational” end to find—like Thomas Metzinger, and others like him—that 
there is no real “self” at all.  
All this is not to say that Graham disagrees with a materialist understanding of 
(human and nonhuman) animal being altogether. In fact, from her collections Never (2002b) 
and Overlord (2005; to which “Dawn Day One” would later be added) onward, Graham 
demonstrates a clear shift from writing the body as a limitation to be suffered towards an 
acknowledgement of the body as a place of contact with others and the world. In still later 
collections such as Sea Change (2009), P L A C E (2012a), and Fast (2017), Graham 
continues to recognise how the body’s form necessarily imposes certain limitations on human 
perception and understanding. However, rather than solely focusing on these constraints, she 
instead focuses on the body’s fundamental role in granting the individual access to the world 
in the first place.   
A person’s body—like the form of the lyric speaker’s indexical symbol “I”—enables 
this unique body/“I” to exist, express thoughts, feelings, and ideas, and even change the 
conditions of their surroundings. Seen from this perspective, the human-animal body no 
longer only represents physical vulnerability and a certain biological determinism, but also 
allows “embodiment as world-openness” (Bartosch 2017, 46); that is, the realised possibility 
of being and expressing, of having agency, and being in contact with others. Importantly, the 
reality of a genuine selfhood is not eliminated by the reality of the body, even if this selfhood 
does emerge from biological processes. This realisation can also be extended to nonhuman 
animals—being a “creature” need not be synonymous with instinctual or reflexive 
behaviours, but can grow to include complex animal subjectivities. 
Embracing embodiment and accepting materialism as the basis of sensory, expressive, 
and agential possibility also means acknowledging the continuity between self and other, and 
the world at large—what the French phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty calls “the flesh of the 
world” (1961). Using vision as an example, it becomes clear that if we are to see we must 
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also be able to be seen; there is no position external to the materiality of the world from 
which to objectively observe it.16 Through embodiment we come into contact and are 
continuous with that which is beyond us.  
Graham gives an interview where she once again defends the reality of the self but, in 
contrast with her earlier work, also warns against forgetting the irreducible and fundamental 
role our bodies have in sustaining this self:  
I could say I would like to find a way to stay out of the picture—but that is one 
of those theoretical positions which are interesting as hell but just academic. 
The truth is, you are the one speaking. You are the one accountable. You are 
the one making the choices. There is no one else there. You do have a self, 
your self, no other. You are free to call yourself a “site of intersections,” all 
you want. No one can deny it. It is also true, in its way. But is it deeply true? 
Is it morally the most demanding position? I do not think so, and, for me—and 
I really do not speak for others—it is not useful. You can call your subject 
position a construct all you want; it feels kind of right, but is it sufficiently 
demanding, are the pressures it generates enough for a wakeful life? For me, it 
feels like too much self-accountability is lifted. The problematic self is heavy, 
it is there in [sic] one’s shoulders, on one’s soul—it is no illusion. It is 
vertiginous, horrific. It is, as Yeats would have it, one’s dying animal. It 
always amazes me how suddenly mortal illness wakes people up. Should we 
wait for tragedy to strike to be suddenly aware of our bodies? And the words 
that remain (should some remain): they will be your words: they will go under 
your name. So, you better work hard to show up for your life—whatever work 
you do—and try to undertake, as Stevens says so beautifully, the act of mind 
in the process of finding “what will suffice.” (Graham 2010) 
Graham no longer implies a separation between the mind of the subject and the form it 
takes—whether it be the physical body or the first-person pronoun. The problems of the 
existence of “the self” (and the limits of its animal body) that she grappled with in the earlier 
stages of her career are unresolved. These issues, she suggests, can never really be resolved, 
                                                             
16 This concept is explained in more depth in Merleau-Ponty’s essay, “Mind and Eye”: “The 




as the argument for there being no true, unitary self in body or text “is also true, in its way.” 
However, Graham does assert that this is really only an “academic” position, and that—for 
the sake of living, and living with others—it must be recognised as insufficient for a moral 
life. Graham’s point here is complex: we are still separated from a complete union with and 
knowledge of the wider world by the specific parameters of our human animal bodies (and, in 
this case, also by the form of the lyric subject position). But these forms are also what grants 
us our access to the world and our ability to act in it. Rather than despair and entirely reject 
the reality that these bodily forms give us, Graham argues that we must “show up” for the 
value and integrity of our lives and selves and take responsibility for our actions in the world. 
By extension, we must also take heed of the responsibilities and respect we owe to the lives 
and similarly bound self-worlds of others. As a lyric poet, this stance also requires Graham to 
acknowledge, and undergo responsibility for, her own subject position in her writing.   
To counter cognitive materialism’s and post-structuralism’s dismantling of the self, 
then, Graham’s mid- to late-career poems “assert an increasingly politicised, coherent, 
autobiographical lyric subject with a strident, moral point of view” (Skillman 2016, 221). 
One way Graham creates this strengthened lyric subject is by creating moments of presence, 
or “wakeful life” for the reader, playing with poetry’s capacity to suspend the reader in a 
moment of time and place them in their feeling, animal body (Graham 2012b, 39). She 
describes this as her “act of attention, of showing up for sensation, perception”: 
I make sure my body comes into play, that my senses are awake—when I am 
in the natural world … The world is there to me because I am an incarnate 
piece of it. I do not feel I need to “reconnect,” I do not feel the divorce to be 
real … There is much control to be gained if one has humans who are cut off 
from their wellspring: they are endlessly more manipulable …There is much 
to be gained as well if one has rendered humans capable of an absence of 
empathy, and a willingness to look the other way. (Graham 2012b, 39–40)  
Graham’s statement indicates a remarkable turnaround from the sense of separation her 
speaker describes when in the presence of other nonhuman animals in her early career, as 
when she laments the feeling of being “never wholly in creation” (1998, 78). Here, “showing 
up” for the human-animal body, and for the self, means accepting the self’s profound 
contingency upon their environment, and the taking up of the responsibility that comes from 
being an agent in the world who can be acted upon, and who can act upon others. For 
example, Graham encourages us to take up the responsibility of imagining the subjective 
experience of the monkey, as a unique living being, rather than simply as an animal subject in 
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a scientific experiment. Acknowledging one’s foundation in materiality (and all the wonders 
of sensation, thought, emotion, and other experiences it brings to the human subject) means 
reciprocally respecting the Umwelten of other animals whose existence and experiences are 
also predicated upon access to the world through their bodies.  
 At the end of “Dawn Day One,” the speaker directly addresses the reader:  
Here. You are at the beginning of something. At the exact  
beginning. OK. This is awakening 
number two in here, this poem. Then there are  
these: me: you: you there. I’m actually staring up at  
you, you know, right there, right from the pool of this page.  
Don’t worry where else I am, I am here. Don’t  
worry if I’m still alive, you are.  
(Graham 2004, 31) 
The end of the poem mirrors the start with another awakening into the body, except this time 
she transfers the onus of this awakening onto the reader. The reader is invoked not only 
through the second-person pronoun (“you”) sounding throughout, but also through the 
similarly repetitive and rhythmic deictic language that locates (“Here,” “you there,” “right 
there,” “I am here”) and which affirms the body and presence of writer and reader in their 
space and time. 
Graham places the reader in themselves “at the beginning of something”; that is, at 
the beginning of all the actions that they will undertake from that point onward. She insists on 
her reality, too, at the time of writing. Even if she does not exist beyond that point, she was 
alive and real at that time, and continues to have agency through the body of her writing and 
its effect on the reader. In this, she confirms the power and reality of the embodied human 
animal self. The colons that fill the fourth line suggest some expectation of an answer, or a 
causal relationship between the components they link together—“Then there are / these: me: 
you: you there.” These things—the “you and me” of text and reality—exist each other. These 
are things—selfhoods—that are, and thus can act, and act upon one another. In this line, 
Graham awakens us both to our ineluctable connection to others (both human and nonhuman) 
and to the reality of the self—perhaps the two most essential ingredients needed to act 
ethically in the world.  
In this chapter, I have demonstrated Graham’s shifting understanding of the role of 
the human’s animal body as the site of experience. She revises her original emphasis on 
embodiment as a limitation that offers only an imperfect and circumscribed point of view to 
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instead celebrate the body as a form that enables world-openness and agentic possibility. 
Throughout this journey, Graham looks to other animal figures—whether they be the salmon, 
butterfly, or the monkey—to better sense and understand her own animal self. In the 
following chapter, I will show how Lispector, too, identifies and defines her animal being 
through animal figures external and internal to the self, and how she also finds a continuity 




2. Lispector and How to Capture Life “Behind Thought” 
Like Graham, Lispector is interested in how to “captar,” or “capture,” the flow and motion of 
life against the constraints of static human language.17 However, as Fernanda Negrete notes, 
this action of “capturing” reads differently in Lispector’s Portuguese texts. In addition to the 
sense of the English verb “to capture,” the Portuguese verb captar also means “to receive,” so 
that “the gesture in Lispector’s work emphasises receptivity and attunement. Lifewriting here 
is receiving, in the way a signal is received by antennae” (Negrete 2018, 14). The word 
suggests a type of language that better allows Lispector to write texts that attend to the 
reciprocal flow between life and language, or a type of language that might simultaneously 
capture and tune into the world external to the text.  
Again, like Graham, another of Lispector’s key interests is how to represent the 
“impersonal life” of the human that precedes their sense of individual subjectivity. Two of 
Lispector’s novels—The Passion According to G.H. (2012; A paixão segundo G.H., [1964] 
2013) and Água Viva ([1973] 1998a; The Stream of Life, 1989)—approach the challenge of 
capturing or transmitting life by choosing to portray the human not as a product of culture, or 
the narratives we tell about ourselves, but as living animal beings. Lispector’s experiments 
are among the most striking attempts in literature to write “impersonal life,” crafting 
characters that seek to express their being from a place of pre-linguistic, pre-formal livingness 
common to all animals, and which exists “behind thought” and, therefore, typically outside of 
language (Negrete 2018, 7).  
Animals are indispensable to how Lispector imagines this primary way of being. For 
Lispector, animals represent a state of direct contact with what she calls the “it”18 of life 
without the shaping of experience through language or the narration of human consciousness. 
In both The Passion and Água Viva, the central characters look to other animals and plumb 
their own animality to try to find new expressive possibilities in language. In this respect, 
Lispector’s work shares common ground with Julia Kristeva’s theory of signification and 
“the semiotic.” 
                                                             
17 Lispector’s preoccupation with the act of “captar” is evidenced by her extensive use of the 
verb throughout Água Viva, where it appears twice on the first page alone (1998a, 9).   
18 Lispector uses the English word “it” in the original Brazilian Portuguese text as well, the 
reasons for which I will discuss in my reading of Água Viva later in the chapter.  
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Kristeva’s theory of signification proposes a divide in language between a male-
coded, rule-based modality called “the symbolic” and a female-coded one called “the 
semiotic” (Kristeva 1980). The semiotic refers to all the pre-logical, affective aspects of 
language (such as its rhythm, prosody, and sound) that are inherent to language, but which 
are “other” to its dominant use as a sense-making tool. Kristeva’s ideas on signification are 
guided by her background in psychoanalysis and her interest in Lacanian concepts of 
language acquisition and psycho-sexual development in children (Schippers 2011, 26). In 
Lacan’s model, the semiotic mode designates the pre-Oedipal period in a child’s life where 
they are ruled by bodily drives and have yet to develop an identity separate from their 
mother. The child only enters into the structured symbolic mode—and, through this, the 
wider world of society and culture that relies on these structures—when they have established 
an identity separate from their mother, have acquired language, and have internalised a clear 
distinction between themselves as subjects and the world of external objects.  
Lacan saw these developmental stages as chronological, with the symbolic ultimately 
replacing the semiotic mode. Kristeva, by contrast, theorises that they remain in a constant 
dialogue, with the semiotic persisting throughout one’s life and language as a “subversive 
force” within the symbolic (Schippers 2011, 26). According to Kristeva, both language and 
the subject are constantly “in process,” and continue to oscillate between the semiotic and 
symbolic modes. Both modes are critical to language and the construction of a stable subject, 
and neither can exist without the other: the symbolic allows ideas to be expressed in a 
communicable form, while the semiotic subverts and enriches this standardised form as it is 
forced to evolve by the challenge of capturing those extra-linguistic sensations that evade its 
grasp, preventing the symbolic mode from becoming ossified and inflexible.19  
                                                             
19 Judith Butler is a notable sceptic of Kristeva’s theory of signification and subjectivisation, 
asserting that “the relationship between the semiotic and symbolic is hierarchical” and that 
the male-coded symbolic “assumes a hegemonic role in this relationship that makes it 
immune to challenge” by the female-coded semiotic (Schippers 2011, 33). Butler concludes 
that “the semiotic cannot serve as a subversive force, because it is embedded in a symbolic 
law which inherently tames any challenge to its prohibitions” (33). Another way to read this 
argument is that Kristeva believes the feminine mode of language to be that which is 
unformed and undifferentiated; a mode that threatens dissolution and which is unable to 
assert political or cultural force without taking the form and structure of the masculine 
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In my reading of Lispector’s works, I wish to extend Kristeva’s theory of signification 
so that the semiotic includes the “subversive force” that our own animal being exerts on the 
rule-bound structures of human expression. By associating the animal part of oneself with the 
pre-linguistic and so-called “pre-Oedipal” development of language and the self (a stage 
where bodily sensations and demands dominate one’s experience of the world), Lispector 
draws animality into the realm of the semiotic. And, just as there is antagonism between the 
symbolic and semiotic modes, there also exists an antagonism between Lispector’s desire to 
write an animal text that transmits a sense of completely unabstracted and directly felt 
experience of the world and its necessary realisation in human language. It is this tension in 
particular that I will examine in Lispector’s two novels to ascertain how an author might 
achieve an animal mode of writing in human text. Further, keeping in mind Graham’s lessons 
from the previous chapter about the possible risks of shunning the responsibilities that come 
from a unified sense of human selfhood, I will explore the moral implications of seeking to 
relinquish or loosen human structures in favour of “becoming-animal.”   
Lispector’s most explicit writing on the conflict between a “human” symbolic mode 
and “animal” semiotic mode comes from the opening pages of The Passion. She describes a 
woman—formerly the sculptor G.H., and who may reassemble to be that woman again by the 
end of the novel—who struggles to account for an unexpected and potentially life-altering 
mystical experience triggered by an interaction with a cockroach. This highly intense but 
presently meaningless brush with the “it” of life threatens to dissolve her human persona:   
I get so scared when I realise I lost my human form for several hours. I don’t 
know if I’ll have another to replace the one I lost….  
… But I also don’t know what form to give what happened to me. And 
without giving it a form, nothing can exist for me … I can only understand 
what happens to me but things only happen that I understand—what do I know 
of the rest? the rest didn’t exist. Maybe nothing ever existed! Maybe all that 
happened to me was a slow and great dissolution? And that this is my struggle 
against that disintegration: trying now to give it a form? A form shapes the 
chaos, a form gives construction to the amorphous substance—.… 
                                                             
symbolic mode—as if male-coded language were the only means to create cogent and 
effective messages about feminine experience.  
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… But what do I do now? Should I cling to the whole vision, even if 
that means having an incomprehensible truth? or do I give a form to the 
nothing, and that would be my attempt to integrate within me my own 
disintegration? … 
… since I’ll inevitably succumb to the need for form that comes from 
my terror of remaining undelimited—then I may at least have the courage to 
let this shape form by itself like a scab that hardens by itself, like the fiery 
nebula that cools into earth. And may I have the great courage to resist the 
temptation to invent a form…. 
 … I’m afraid to “make” a meaning, with the same tame madness that 
till yesterday was my healthy way of fitting into a system. (Lispector 2012, 6–
7)  
Lispector associates this “amorphous substance” that resists form, but which nonetheless 
necessitates a form in order to be thought of and expressed, with life itself. This “substance” 
precedes and is behind or underneath conscious thought, and Lispector suggests it can only 
be glimpsed in moments of intense feeling when reason and language fail, such as when in a 
state of ecstasy, beatitude, horror, or disgust.  
G.H. encounters this livingness through contact with the alien existence of the 
cockroach, a life form so old and persistent in its primitive appearance that it was “an 
embarrassment so painful and so frightened and so innocent” (Lispector 2012, 51). The 
cockroach is an “embarrassment” to G.H. because she is looking at “life looking back” at her 
in a way that no abstraction of language or reason can deny or disguise (51).  
The cockroach, for G.H., represents a being that has only one possible feeling: “the 
awareness of living, inextricable from its body” (Lispector 2012, 43). Confronted with the 
cockroach’s unconsidered and unmediated state of being, G.H. is placed in the impossible 
position of attempting to think what it is like to be without thought: to theorise what it is to 
exist in the world without shaping it through abstraction, expectation, or narrative.  
Lispector uses the term acréscimo (accretion) throughout The Passion to describe the 
human behaviour of distancing one’s self through abstractions from one’s own vulnerable 
state of living. After her contact with the cockroach, G.H. instead seeks to “stop myself from 
giving a name to the thing,” as naming is but “an accretion, and blocks contact with the thing. 
The name of the thing is an interval for the thing. The desire for the accretion is great—
because the naked thing is so tedious” (145). Finding that her former life—one constructed 
from the superficial “accretions” of society and convention—has prevented her from sensing 
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her own imperceptible but irreducible livingness, G.H. desires to also exist in a cockroach-
like state where she avoids attaching superfluous labels, values, or meanings to objects so that 
she can instead come to terms with her own innate and impersonal “living neutrality” that is 
colourless, odourless, mute, and insensible, but which predicates all being.   
As with Graham’s relationships with her animal figures, G.H.’s relationship with the 
cockroach begins with looking:  
I looked at its mouth: there was the real mouth.  
 I had never seen a roach’s mouth. I in fact—I had never actually seen a 
cockroach. I had just been repulsed by its ancient and ever-present existence—
but had never actually come face-to-face with one, not even in thought. 
(Lispector 2012, 48) 
And, once more, as in Graham’s works, this looking is characterised by certain limitations. 
For example, Irving Goh compares how Lispector describes her human and animal 
characters’ ways of seeing in the novel to conclude that G.H.’s human sight is in fact a kind 
of blindness, preconditioned as it is by her expectations: “to live with preconceived ideas . . . 
is the conditioning of one’s perception of life, of oneself, of others, and of the world. As such, 
foresight for G.H. is but a simulacrum of vision, a vision that in fact sees nothing” (Goh 
2012, 116). On an individual scale, this blindness has limited G.H’s potential for connection 
with others—both human (like her maid, Janair) and animal (the cockroach). On a larger 
scale, this blindness causes insidious failures to witness those who are “other” to the broader, 
organisational structures of human societies:   
In The Passion, the path toward living neutrality entails undoing everything 
that has formed some kind of framework that allowed one to present oneself as 
a subject of culture, civility, and reason. That framework, which is also the 
process of “humanisation” according to The Passion, has only veiled or 
blinded humanity from its quintessential condition of living freely: 
humanisation has only smothered life with its plethora of moral or ethical 
codes, blinding one to the bare truth of living freely, while doing little for the 
progress of human civilisation. (Goh 2012, 115) 
Sight and expectation are explicitly bound together in Portuguese. “Previsão” 
(literally “pre-vision”), the word that Goh translates as “foresight,” is translated by Idra 
Novey in the 2012 edition of The Passion as “expectation.” The Portuguese term—which can 
also be translated as “forecast,” “forethought,” “prediction,” and “outlook”—indicates an 
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intimate relationship between vision and thought: a type of seeing and thinking that does not 
singularly exist in the present, but which is always looking back to previous experience in 
order to make assumptions about what is, or will be, happening now, or in the future. In order 
to move from this “previsão” of “human subjective vision” to what Goh terms a neutral 
“animal optics” (2012, 129), G.H. must let go of expectation:  
My expectations [previsões] preconditioned what I would see. They weren’t 
previsions of a vision: they were already the size of my concerns. My 
expectations [previsões] closed the world to me. (Lispector 2012, 8) 
A perspective coloured by expectations, thoughts, and words is one removed from the “thing” 
or “it” of life’s objects. The objects become symbolic representations valued more for their 
human meaning or use—their “accretions”—than their being in the present, something that 
G.H. realises when she looks around her home of good taste and finds: “The witty elegance 
of my house comes from everything here being in quotes” (Lispector 2012, 22). “Imitating” a 
life with a light and enjoyable irony has given G.H. “assurance precisely because that life 
wasn’t my own: it wasn’t a responsibility of mine” (22). In the face of the living cockroach, 
however, she is stripped of the cushioning of her human “accretions” and exposed to the state 
of her bare life.  
Goh argues that in order for G.H. to live and see freely she must first reach a state of 
“‘depersonalisation’ or ‘inexpressiveness’—in effect, the dissolution of subjectivity” (Goh 
2012, 116). To achieve this, G.H. must relinquish the anthropomorphising narratives of the 
eye and mind. Or, to put it another way, she must defamiliarise herself from her automatic 
and default attitudes towards the things she witnesses in order to see them anew. G.H. seeks 
to perform this escape from the symbolic mode through an intense imagining of—and, at the 
climax of the novel, literal attempt to incorporate—the cockroach that she sees as the 
antithesis of her humanised being.  
G.H.’s progress towards “becoming-cockroach” begins with G.H. acknowledging the 
shared livingness between herself and the insect:   
Because I’d looked at the living roach and was discovering inside it the identity of 
my deepest life. In a difficult demolition, hard and narrow paths were opening 
within me….  
… Because rising to my surface like pus was my truest matter—and with fright 
and loathing I was feeling that “I-being” was coming from a source far prior to the 




Moving beyond an acknowledgement of a shared basis in living matter, G.H.’s identification 
with the cockroach intensifies until she begins to describe herself in cockroach-like terms. 
For example:  
The cockroach is pure seduction. Cilia, blinking cilia that keep calling.  
 I too, who was slowly reducing myself to whatever in me was 
irreducible, I too had thousands of blinking cilia, and with my cilia I move 
forward, I protozoan, pure protein. (Lispector 2012, 54) 
And:  
I, neutral cockroach body, I with a life that at last doesn’t escape me because I 
finally see it outside of myself—I am the roach, I am my leg, I am my hair—I 
am every hellish piece of me. (Lispector 2012, 60) 
When G.H. finally confesses to eating the paste spurting from the cockroach’s split back, she 
has committed so completely to a fundamental sameness between herself and the creature 
that the taste of the cockroach becomes the “taste of myself—I was spitting out myself” 
(Lispector 2012, 175).  
G.H.’s journey towards the cockroach has been read by a number of scholars as an 
example of what Deleuze and Guattari term “Becoming-Animal” (2007). “Becoming,” in this 
case, describes the process of an individual entering into an alliance, often through a work of 
literature, with some other anomalous agent (real or imagined) that acts as the defining border 
for the multiplicity of its group or pack; in this particular case, the cockroach represents all 
cockroaches and G.H. is a representative of all humanity. Importantly, “becoming” does not 
describe a transition from one state to another, or from one subject (or subjectivity) to 
another:  
Becoming animal does not consist in playing animal or imitating an animal … 
the human being does not “really” become an animal any more than the 
animal “really” becomes something else. Becoming produces nothing other 
than itself. We fall into a false alternative if we say that you either imitate or 
you are. What is real is the becoming itself, the block of becoming, not the 
supposedly fixed terms through which what becomes passes. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2007, 38; emphasis added) 
Deleuze and Guattari thus insist that “becoming” does not change the individual in essence, 
but only affects the subject to the degree that their own multiplicity is sensed; the human is 
already animal, already biological, already cellular, already without harsh and definite 
distinction between individual entity and wider world. Ideally, “becoming” describes a 
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process that “lacks a subject distinct from itself” (Deleuze and Guattari 2007, 38), and which 
happens within the space already occupied by the individual.   
In the novel, G.H. progresses through her own series of “becomings” or awakenings 
to experiences beyond her self-contained and pre-conditioned identity. She first comes to 
apprehend the difference in experience between herself and that of her former maid, Janair, as 
a poor, black woman in Brazil—a person that G.H. realises she had only ever seen as “an 
invisible person” (Lispector 2012, 33).20 Next, prompted by the look of the cockroach—“its 
eyes…looking at me monotonously, the two neutral and fertile ovaries” (90)—G.H. 
remembers “the saltlessness of the time I was pregnant (90),” filled with “the happy horror of 
the neutral life that lives and moves” (91), and walked through the streets to think on a 
decision she had already made—“knowing I’d have the abortion, doctor, I who about 
children only know and only would know that I was going to have an abortion” (90). She 
comes to another realisation about her former lover, a man with whom, at the time, she did 
not recognise as sharing a constant, if imperceptible, togetherness: “It’s that, when we loved, 
I didn’t know that love was happening much more exactly when the thing we were calling 
love wasn’t there. The neutral of love, that was what we were living and despising” (122). 
Finally, of course, there is her coming-to-awareness of the cockroach itself, and, through this, 
her entering into what she understands to be the invisible, immanent, and divine livingness 
that extends across all living beings.  
It may seem in the above examples that G.H. finds a way to respectfully reach beyond 
the confines of her own embodiment and subjecthood through an apprehension of these 
others’ livingness. Indeed, in the case of the cockroach, most scholars who have read The 
Passion through the lens of Deleuze’s and Guattari’s “Becoming-Animal” see G.H.’s 
revelation as a largely positive step towards dismantling human exceptionalism through a 
post-humanist alignment with an animal other (Braidotti 1994; Ittner 2005, 106; Goh, 
2012).21 
                                                             
20 See also Levilson C. Reis’s “The Invisible, the Unclean, the Uncanny: The Feminine Black 
Other in Lispector’s The Passion According to G.H.” (2010).  
21  One notable exception is Goh’s later reading of The Passion that worries about the 
violence perpetuated through G.H.’s act of touch that goes beyond an imaginary alliance with 
the cockroach to a literal breaching of its bodily limits (Goh 2016).   
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A key question to ask of G.H.’s “becomings,” however, is whether they demonstrate 
an affective alliance with marginal others in a “fibre of becoming” that collects together 
“animals, plants, microorganisms, mad particles, a whole galaxy” (Deleuze and Guattari 
2007, 47) in eclectic kinship and ethical response-ability, or whether they are instead 
appropriative identifications that neglect the very real differences between those beings—
particularly in the conditions of their embodiment.  
G.H.’s relationship with the cockroach marks the disintegration of her human 
selfhood, and with it the human morality that she associates with the false accretions of 
human law and the symbolic:  
Ah, at least I had already entered the cockroach’s nature to the point that I no 
longer wanted to do anything for it. I was freeing myself from my morality, 
and that was a catastrophe without crash and without tragedy. … I no longer 
wanted to do anything for the roach. I was freeing myself from my morality—
though that gave me fear, curiosity and fascination; and much fear. I’m not 
going to do anything for you, I too creep along the ground. (Lispector 2012, 
84–85) 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Graham refuses to dissolve the human subject into the 
material and biological continuum between human and animal for fear of the loss of personal 
responsibility and moral accountability that this collapsing of the human self would bring 
about. In the passages above, however, we can see that Lispector’s character moves in the 
opposite direction. G.H. freely relinquishes her subjecthood into this continuum in a gesture 
of avowedly “neutral” amorality that seeks to level the differences between the categories of 
“human” and “animal” through an explicit emphasis on their shared existence in life and 
matter.  
G.H.’s actions have made the cockroach’s death inevitable, and yet she neither feels 
remorse nor does anything to help the creature. Her new-found belief in the immanent and 
interchangeable living neutrality that permeates throughout all beings leads her instead to see 
this murder as another way of “relating” to the cockroach, a way of “existing the other being” 
in a profound sense:  
The deepest murder: the one that is a way of relating, a way of one being 
existing the other being, a way of seeing one other and being one other and 
having one other, murder where there is neither victim nor executioner, but a 
link of mutual ferocity. (Lispector 2012, 79) 
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G.H. claims that if the cockroach “were larger than I, with neutral busy pleasure it would kill 
me. Just as the violent neutral of its life was allowing me, because I was not imprisoned and 
was larger, to kill it” (84). But, of course, the fact remains that G.H. is much more powerful, 
and has more faculties than the cockroach who, apart from prompting revulsion, is essentially 
harmless. G.H. attempts to escape her humanity through debasing herself—by operating at an 
animal level where life kills life, and life eats life, in the cruelly “neutral” way of nature. 
However, G.H. has not literally “become-cockroach,” and she can neither “exist” nor 
kill the cockroach as if she were another insect. G.H. is human, and she remains bound to 
symbolic thought and language. She tells a story of the cockroach that ultimately suits her 
needs (even if this “need” is paradoxically to try to overcome dependence on telling stories). 
The cockroach and its life are not at the centre of this story, which is instead about G.H.’s 
experience of a corrupted beatitude. The cockroach is entirely dropped from the final pages 
of the novel where its inexorable death goes unmentioned.  
 Lispector’s treatment of animality in general is more often attuned to animals’ 
metaphorical possibilities than their literal being. For example, she often uses the horse, “her 
favourite totemic figure” (Cixous 1990, 41), to represent an automatic mode of writing that is 
near-unconscious and free:   
Yes, this is life seen by life itself. But suddenly I forget how to capture what 
happens, I don’t know how to capture what exists except by living here each 
thing that may come, no matter what it is: I’m almost free of my mistakes. I let 
the freed horse run wildly. (Lispector 1989, 12) 
In Água Viva, from which this quotation is taken, there are no animal figures external to the 
protagonist’s stream of consciousness but numerous animals appear in amongst the flow of 
her thinking and writing, sometimes identified by species, sometimes not, and often tinged 
with a certain nostalgia:  
I need to feel the it of the animals again. It’s been a long time since I’ve come 
into contact with primitive animal life. … I tremble all over when I enter into 
physical contact with animals or with the mere sight of them. Animals 
fascinate me. They’re the time that one can’t count as it passes by … An 
animal never substitutes one thing for another. (Lispector 1989, 38) 
Her idyllic view even leads to envy:  
I’m the one who is ill from the human condition. I rebel: I don’t want to be a 
person anymore. Who? who has pity on us who know about life and death, 
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when an animal I profoundly envy—is unconscious of its condition? 
(Lispector 1989, 77) 
This is the crucial role that animality plays in these two Lispector novels: animals provide a 
useful point of comparison through which to understand her characters’ human condition. As 
G.H. states, “inhuman beings, like the cockroach, carry out their own complete cycle without 
ever erring because they do not choose,” whereas it depends on the human individual “to 
carry out our inevitable destiny”—the destiny of having “the freedom to carry out or not” any 
of the overwhelming number of ways a person could choose to live her life (Lispector 2012, 
129).  
Lispector’s representation of animality, then, while elucidating a particular view of 
what it is to be human, flattens all the multiple ways of being animal into a single mode: an 
automatic, reflexive, and unmediated contact with the “it” of life. Unsurprisingly, this limited 
definition becomes insupportable if tested against reality. Very little debate continues, for 
example, about the ability of some animals to “know about life and death” (Lispector 1989, 
77) that Lispector’s character suggests is solely the curse of the human. Elephants grieve the 
loss of family members, often staying with the body for days, and will clearly react to, and 
stop to investigate, the skeletal remains of their own species while ignoring those of others. 
Other animals, too, including orcas and chimpanzees, show signs of mourning (Safina 2015). 
To take another of Lispector’s statements, there are numerous cases—with research finding 
new examples all the time—of animals who demonstrate the ability to “substitute one thing 
for another” (Lispector 1989, 38). For instance, the New Caledonian crow (like some 
primate, dolphin, and possibly octopus species) is able to use tools to access difficult-to-reach 
foods. It recognises the potential for a stick or malleable wire to be used for this purpose, 
thereby “substituting” that stick or wire for a useful implement (Main 2019; McCall 2015). 
Lispector’s representation of animals as having no sense of the passage of time is also 
undermined by recent research that suggests that the jumping spider Portia Africana (despite 
being from a class of animals that are typically assumed to have few complex mental skills) 
“possess an abstract working memory,” are able to model the future, “plan out intricate 
detours,” and learn from past experiences (Greshko 2016). Even Lispector’s example of life 
at its most primitive and basic, the cockroach, is itself far from simple. The majority of 
cockroach species are able to recognise members of their own family group and have 
complex social structures and behaviours—including shared parental care for their young 
(Costa 2006, 147). Social aggregates of cockroaches appear to make collective decisions 
about food sources and can even communicate information to one another through chemical 
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signals (Pennisi 2015). These listed examples of course represent an extremely small sample 
of the countless and diverse ways of animal being, and one that is still skewed by what is 
considered valuable from a human perspective.  
I do not list these instances of complexity in animal behaviour to suggest that 
Lispector was ignorant of the difference between the reality of animal lives and the animal 
lives she represents, or that her statements are to be taken literally; nor do I wish to diminish 
the important role that animality has, as Lispector uses it, for investigating alternative ways of 
operating within the subjective, linguistic, and social structures that her characters struggle 
against. I do think it is worthwhile, however, to consider the implications of flattening animal 
experience to a single definition, as doing so evidently reinforces a narrative of human 
exceptionalism—in this case, in an inverted form where “human” traits are seen as a uniquely 
burdensome limitation rather than an especially good thing. In the case of The Passion, in 
particular, where the novel depicts physical violence against an animal, it is important to 
consider the consequences of limiting the scope of animal experience.  
 G.H. explicitly acknowledges a shared quality of livingness that exists between 
herself and the animal in front of her. And yet, while she is able to locate animality within 
herself, there is no corresponding recognition of the complex way of being in the world that 
she might consider “intelligent” or “human-like” in the animal. In this sense, despite asserting 
a continuity between herself and the cockroach, G.H. maintains a strong distinction between 
what she considers to be “human” and “animal” characteristics. The result of this distinction 
is that she does not view her own “human” subjectivity and rational thinking as another 
iteration of being animal, nor that being an animal might allow one to be more than a living 
object. To achieve a “depersonalised” and “dehumanised” state—and rid herself of the 
acculturation and ways of thinking that have shaped her life thus far—G.H. seeks to escape 
through “becoming” a form of life on the abject margins of her society’s concern.  
When G.H. eats the cockroach, she performs a break from symbolic law (in addition 
to her break from structured human sight and language) as she touches and incorporates what 
Kristeva terms “the abject.” Kristeva’s theory of abjection builds upon the work of Mary 
Douglas in Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Pollution and Taboo (1966), which explores 
the cultural treatment of marginal materials that are either considered dangerous and polluting 
(and therefore expelled) or, conversely, re-incorporated into society through their 
transposition into a sacred object. Kristeva (1982) defines “the abject” as that which is neither 
subject nor object—for example, those things which come from the body but which are no 
longer attached to it, such as hair, or blood, spit, and other excrement. These marginal 
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materials occupy a liminal space and therefore, Kristeva argues, fill a person with horror and 
disgust for their transgression of a clean division between self and other. When G.H. eats the 
cockroach, she also enters into this liminal and disorganised space, and, in doing so, 
vehemently violates to which she belongs, both religious:  
—the law commands us to keep only what is disguisedly alive. And the law 
commands that, whoever eats of the unclean, must do so unawares. Since 
whoever eats of the unclean knowing that it is unclean—will also know that 
the unclean is not unclean. Is that it?  
“And everything that crawls and has wings shall be impure and not be 
eaten.” (Lispector 2012, 70)  
And cultural: 
All that time I hadn’t wanted to think what I had already thought: that the 
roach is edible as a lobster, the roach is a crustacean. (Lispector 2012, 116) 
G.H.’s passion, a gruesome parody of the Eucharist, represents a desire to overcome the 
structures of her humanity by overcoming the imperative of her revulsion. Lispector 
defamiliarises and recontextualises an act of devotion—the socialised rite of eating and 
drinking of the body and blood of Jesus Christ—to expose its abject nature, and to invert it, 
so that a reviled creature comes to embody the divine; in this case, divine because it 
symbolises a direct embodiment of and contact with the “it” of life.   
 To become-animal/abject may facilitate “the possibility to create an adjacent space 
where life is free(d) from the capture of striating State politics” (Goh 2009, 55) and other 
laws—whether they be the structures of thought and language, or the 
“foresight”/“expectations” that frame one’s interactions with the world. Wilfully occupying a 
subterranean and abject space may also offer a certain attraction as an alternative to dominant 
(and sometimes inflexible and prejudiced) modes of thinking and being. Choosing to occupy 
this abject space, however, risks curtailing one’s ability to be a cogent political subject. In 
this, I see a parallel between the impotency of the semiotic mode (in which individuals are 
unable to form language or a subjectivity, and are therefore barred from participating in 
culture and advocating for their rights) and the impotency of an individual who “becomes-
animal”—strictly in those cases where the individual thinks of animal being as an existence 
ruled by innate drives, and one without the ability for abstract thought or empathy.  
  “Becoming-animal” in this exaggerated case—where an individual risks their sense 
of self in order to express their inherent “animality”—can become a project which is not only 
“inhuman” but also “inhumane” (Malay 2018, 136; original emphasis). As Graham warns, 
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shirking one’s selfhood invokes the collateral loss of one’s ability to reason, apprehend 
differences, and respond ethically—attributes that are positive, and which can also (in 
addition to the more repressive strictures that Lispector’s characters rail against) be 
incorporated into the concrete structures of moral codes and law over time. Further, to believe 
that this “animal mode” reflects a true state of animality denies complex animal individuals 
their own moral subjecthood as beings that are capable of a sense of fairness, and who can 
feel distress at others’ suffering and seek to alleviate this suffering in ways that do not 
directly benefit the self, for just a couple of examples.22  
Again, I do not intend to argue against Lispector’s attempts to find some way to 
represent animal livingness in text, or even against the possibility of using the animality 
inherent in one’s human self as a possible avenue for exploring new ways to write within, or 
edit, symbolic structures. What is important to acknowledge, however, is that while this play 
is happening one remains a human animal throughout. Literary events of “becoming-animal” 
always happen within the context of a human body—a human body that has a certain 
experience of the world and certain means to express this experience. Lispector does tacitly 
acknowledge this context of the human body and its modes of expression by writing her great 
work of “unpronounceable” meanings and animal being in human symbolic language. In 
doing so, she recognises the unavoidable need for abstract forms and structures if we are to 
express anything at all. If, however, a person does disregard their humanity, which persists—
as Deleuze and Guattari stress—through any “becoming,” and truly believes that they are 
able to embody or claim the experience of another, this play can have very real, very 
destructive consequences. It must be an imagining that recognises the grounds and 
embodiment of its own condition, and respects the differences of others.  
 At the end of The Passion, G.H. comes to the same realisation:  
No. I did not need to have had the courage to eat the paste of the roach. Since I 
lacked the humility of the saints: I had given to the act of eating it a meaning 
of “maximum.” But life is divided into qualities and kinds, and the law is that 
the roach shall only be loved and eaten by another roach; and that a woman, in 
the hour of love for a man, that woman is living her own kind. I understood 
                                                             
22 See “Animal Morality: What It Means and Why It Matters” (2018) by Susana Monsó, 
Judith Benz-Schwarzburg, and Annika Bremhorst for a broader exploration of the harm 
caused by denying animal subjects the opportunity to express their moral capabilities.  
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that I had already done the equivalent of living the paste of the roach—for the 
law is that I must live with the matter of a person and not of a roach. 
(Lispector 2012, 178) 
In this passage, G.H. accepts that she does not have to fully comprehend or occupy the space 
of an other in order to apprehend and respect their difference. She acknowledges, too, that it 
was she who assigned the cockroach a meaning, and that the cockroach itself did not act in 
any particular way to trigger her defamiliarising experience. Finally, there is the distinctly 
human frame that Lispector places over the entire text to demonstrate that the novel 
represents only one individual human’s point of view—this is, after all, the passion 
“according to” (segundo) G.H, and it is thus informed and limited by the same 
understandings and biases as its principal character.   
Like The Passion, Lispector’s later novel Água Viva also seeks to unsettle and 
energise a human symbolic mode through the subversive presence of an animal semiotic. 
While there are no explicit animal characters in Água Viva for the protagonist to define her 
identity through and against, the novel is inhabited by a number of animal figures that 
represent an animal livingness inherent in the self. In this novel, Lispector also focuses on the 
sensory aspects of being a human animal—a focus that is reflected by the work’s deeper 
consideration of, and play with, the material and sensory aspects of language. By moving 
through animal figures as a first step towards an unabstracted animal semiotic mode, 
Lispector pushes her writing to even bolder attempts at creating a language to capture/receive 
(captar) the sense of one’s own living. Paradoxically, this writing that seeks to occupy and 
transmit an immediate and felt animal mode is perhaps her most conceptual piece. 
Animals and animality are central to how Lispector’s author-character imagines a 
semiotic mode that occurs “behind thought” and in the “now-instant.” 23 And, as we have 
already seen in The Passion, Lispector’s texts tend to represent a somewhat limited view of 
animals (as those beings that embody the “it” of life) in ways that often have more to do with 
her specific aims in writing than a desire to portray the diverse self-worlds of animals. This 
remains true for Água Viva. In the novel, the animal figures act as objects through which to 
imagine or suggest an alternative mode of living to contrast human structures of subjecthood, 
thought, and language. Drawing on the metaphorical possibilities that the difference of the 
animal offers—and which language cannot fully grasp—Lispector creates a text energised by 
                                                             
23 Água Viva is written from the first-person perspective of a narrating character, figured as 
the author, who describes her intentions and the act of writing the novel within the text itself.  
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the potential of an animal semiotic mode that intimates to readers, without having to seize it 
in certain terms, the “unpronounceable” presence of life itself.   
We can see this function of animals in Lispector’s novel by starting with its title. 
Água Viva carries a number of meanings. It literally translates as “living water,” but can also 
mean “jelly fish” (Negrete 2018, 65). The jelly fish becomes an emblem of what Lispector 
attempts to achieve in this novel: she seeks to create in language a transparent, ungraspable 
being that represents a unabstracted embodiment of the “it” of life, nearly indivisible from the 
greater body of water—or “água vivas” (which can also mean “high ocean tides”)—that 
surrounds it (Negrete 2018, 65). In the body of the text, this role is played by the similarly 
slippery and aqueous oyster: “The transcendent in me is the living, soft ‘it,’ and it has the 
thoughts an oyster has” (1989, 22) (“A transcendência dentro de mim é o ‘it’ vivo e mole e 
tem o pensament que uma ostra tem”; Lispector 1998a, 30). Here, and throughout the original 
text, Lispector chooses to use the English word “it” when referring to the transcendent 
livingness that encompasses and extends to all species. Using the English enables Lispector to 
defamiliarise her Portuguese-speaking readers, to cause them pause, and to draw their 
attention to the word. Further, using English here enables Lispector to avoid the gendered 
pronouns for “it” (ele/ela) of her native Portuguese, and to suggest that the “impersonal life” 
that her protagonist seeks to capture/transmit here precedes the individualised, gendered 
subject. This choice perhaps suggests another failure by Lispector (or her character) to fully 
realise the subjecthood of animals. While her narrator may conflate animal being with a mode 
of undifferentiated and “impersonal life,” animals are typically not neuter but have sexually 
defined bodies that can affect their subjective experiences and engagement with the world 
and its others.  
Lispector is particularly interested in “primitive” life forms that embody to her the 
most unmediated state of present-tense livingness that she feels as an echo within herself. We 
can see this, for example, when her character describes a cave scene that she has painted:   
I see black, hairy spiders. Rats and mice run frightened on the ground and 
along the walls. Among the stones the scorpion. Crabs, unchanged since 
prehistoric times, through countless births and deaths, would seem threatening 
beasts if they were human-sized. Ancient cockroaches drag themselves along 
in the half light. And all this am I. (Lispector 1989, 9) 
Aside from becoming representations for that which is living in the self, animals also become 
symbols of Lispector’s writing, including her aforementioned favourite totem of the horse, or 
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when her character describes her work as that of “the diligent spider,” who does her best 
“when I know nothing and manufacture I don’t know what” (1989, 55).  
 The relationship Lispector’s narrator creates between her writing and the animal body 
is even more evident in the passages where she refers to her work as the labour of birth, or of 
being born. In these instances, the mother cat becomes the figure for her process. Throughout 
the novel there are references to giving birth, the eating of the placenta, and the giving of 
milk as a parallel to the process of giving and sustaining life through her writing practice:  
I’m not objectifying anything: I’m in true birth-labour with the it. I feel dizzy 
like someone who’s going to be born.  
 To be born: I’ve seen a cat giving birth. The kitten comes out enclosed 
in a water sac and all shrivelled inside. The mother licks the water sac so many 
times that it finally breaks and then, behold, an almost-free cat, held only by 
the umbilical cord. Then the cat-mother-creator breaks the cord with her teeth 
and one more fact appears in the world. This process is it. I’m not joking. I’m 
serious. Because I’m free. I’m so simple.  
I’m giving you freedom. First, I break the water sac. Then, I cut your 
umbilical cord. And you are alive, on your own.  
   And when I’m born I’m free. That’s the root of my tragedy.  
 No. It isn’t easy. But it is. I ate my own placenta so I wouldn’t have to 
eat for four days. To have milk to give you. The milk is a this. (Lispector 
1989, 26) 
Lispector’s text emulates a life-producing and nourishing “living water” that is created in 
order to give presence to another fact in the world, another “it.” And this “it” is given to the 
reader as a bringing to awareness of their own fact of being, their own livingness. The text 
encloses everyone (eliding the differences between the body of the watcher, the performer, 
the giver, and the receiver) and everything in its “watery sac” (“saco de água”; Lispector 
1998a, 35), suggesting a profound connection between all beings that is the “é” (“is”), or “it,” 
or “isto” (“this”) of life. However, against this interconnectedness there is the discrete fact of 
the individual’s being—the “tragedy”—that marks each person as a separate agent who must 
rely on the tools of thought and representation in order to create/understand their world and 
their place in it. The animal figures in Água Viva are thus not intended as close portraits of 
animal life per se. They are, instead, an indispensable index through which we can apprehend 




Moving beyond explicit animal figures as an index of the “it” of life, Lispector is able 
to make further, more daring attempts to channel the “behind thought” and present tense 
“now-instant” of life that they help her to conceptualise. One of the ways she tries to draw 
readers’ attention to their own state of living is by focusing on the pre-logical, felt experience 
of being a human animal. In the context of language and writing, this means attending 
specifically to the sound, shape, rhythm, and materiality of language. The protagonist often 
describes the intent of her writing practice in this way:  
And so I realise that I want for myself the vibrant substratum of the word 
repeated in a Gregorian chant. I’m aware that everything I know I cannot say, 
I know only by painting or pronouncing syllables blind of meaning. And if I 
here have to use words for you, they must create an almost exclusively bodily 
meaning. I’m battling with the ultimate vibration. To tell you my substratum I 
make a sentence of words composed only of the now-instants. (Lispector 
1989, 5)  
Lispector’s character here describes her writing as a work created by and for the sensing 
human animal body. It is intended to stimulate or evoke an emotional or sensory meaning 
without declarative sense. She explains this as “a way of expressing silence,” but with words, 
so that one becomes aware of their livingness through a mindfulness of one’s present being in 
response to the text (1989, 37). Ultimately, what Lispector’s protagonist desires is a form of 
writing that is “not a message of ideas but rather an instinctive voluptuousness of what is 
hidden in nature and that I sense”; a “feast of words” that she writes “in signs that are more 
gesture than voice” (16). Of course, the narrator’s statements about her writing—where signs 
are intended more as shapes and gestures than meaningful symbols—contradict themselves. 
In explaining to her reader how she would like them to approach her text, she is giving 
explicit instructions that rely on language’s ability to signify meaning in the symbolic mode.   
By declaring her ambitions in writing Água Viva so clearly, Lispector’s character 
presents a difficult challenge for the critical reader of her work. If we are to take the 
protagonist’s description of her writing as an instruction on how to read the text, it becomes 
obvious that to perform a close reading of the novel would be inappropriate:   
The text that I’m giving you is not to be looked at up close: it takes on its 
secret, previously invisible totality only when it is seen from a high-flying 
airplane. Then it’s possible to discern the interplay of islands, see canals and 
lakes. Understand me: I’m writing you an onomatopoeia, a convulsion of 
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language. I’m transmitting to you not a story but only words which live off 
sound. (Lispector 1989, 19) 
If we take heed of this passage, it is apparent that placing any one section of Água Viva under 
detailed analysis would be to disregard the stated ethos of the text. How, then, do we read this 
book which states that its words are nothing more than a “gesture” (16), a “simile” (13), or 
“bait” to “hook” their elusive sentiments, after which they can be discarded (14)? Perhaps 
what is required for such a text that privileges a sensory and embodied animal semiotic mode 
is a similarly semiotic mode of reading. This provides at least a partial solution to the 
conundrum of how to read Água Viva, and, in a sense, a mirror of it, for such a reading 
likewise falls short of finding a way to communicate details about the novel’s semiotic 
expression without itself relying on symbolic language.   
A semiotic mode of reading would, like the semiotic mode of signification, attend to 
the non-denotative aspects of language, and the reciprocal nature of the affecting/affectedness 
relationship between reader and text. It would expect heterogeneity, or a diversity of readings 
across different embodied, temporal, and cultural contexts.24 And it would also pay heed to 
those “shimmers” of thought, emotion, or sensation that occur adjacent to our experience of 
language, without neglecting the necessary role of material text in creating the space for these 
indefinite sensations.25  
                                                             
24 Kristeva’s theory of signification draws extensively on Russian formalism, especially the 
work of Mikhail Bakhtin, which she uses to argue against “structuralist formalism and 
rationalist, disembodied linguistics” (Schippers 2011, 24). She chooses to focus instead on a 
“poetic language” that favours a mode of reading that attends to “the materiality and sound of 
language,” its rhythm and musicality, and its “heterogeneity” as a language that is “in the 
margins of the symbolic” (27).  
25 Refer also to Lisa Samuels’s “soft text” for another term for those more- or less-defined 
stirrings and sensations that arise alongside thought, speech, and text, but which are not 
actually signified in the hard text itself: “Soft text is potential text arising within language 
users in our interactions with ourselves, permeant surfaces, other persons, and object-events 
of living. It’s the text that silently formulates or never quite materialises in invisible relation 
to speaking, publishing, or other hard text form. Soft text is the invisible textuality of 
potential language: language that stays within the mind. You imagine an utterance but you 
don’t say it, or soft text is what is left out of what you do say” (2018). The term “shimmers” 
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A semiotic mode of reading therefore recognises, as G.H. asserts in The Passion, that 
the “inexpressible” is perhaps best apprehended through an appreciation for the materiality 
(rather than its received or abstracted meaning) of a medium, which suggests its presence and 
gives it form: 
When art is good it is because it has touched upon the inexpressive, the worst 
art is expressive, that art which transgresses the piece of iron and the piece of 
glass, and the smile, and the scream. (Lispector 2012, 149)  
We can begin our animal semiotic reading of Lispector’s text by attending to its 
rhythm. One of the most immediate ways that she suggests the processual and transitory 
happenings of living is by making the ceaselessly repeating pulse of Água Viva not a phrase 
or concrete noun, but a verb: “é” (“is”). As her protagonist explains: “But the most important 
word in the Portuguese language has but a single letter, ‘é,’ ‘is’” (1989, 19) (“Mas a palavra 
mais importante da língua tem uma única letra: é. É” [1998a, 28]). On nearly every page in 
Lispector’s short novel there is a sentence in which the emphasis is placed, not upon the 
content words that carry the meaning of its statement, but instead upon the italicised “is” that 
asserts those objects’ being in the ephemeral now-instant in which the woman describes 
them. Her character states:   
Let me tell you . . . I’m trying to capture the fourth dimension of the now-
instant, which is so fleeting it no longer is because it has already become a 
new now-instant, which also is no longer. Each thing has an instant in which it 
is. I want to take possession of the thing’s is.  
(Lispector 1989, 3) 
 A semiotic reading focusses on the is-ness of the language—its being, which, like the 
verb “é” itself, does not convey any information more than its existence, as a form with a 
sound, a shape, and a moment in time. This, the narrator imagines, is similar to an animal 
mode that does not replace objects with their abstract labels or universal meanings, and 
instead relies on its immediate, felt, embodied, and sensory experience.   
                                                             
for those things “beneath, alongside, or generally other than conscious thought” comes from 




We are encouraged to read the writing as an absent-minded “onomatopoeia” of 
language that luxuriates in its own sound and the ricocheting associations these sounds 
stimulate. For example:  
I’m transmitting to you not a story but only words which live off sound. Thus, 
I say to you:  
 “Exuberant trunk.” 
 And I bath in it. (Lispector 1989a, 19) 
Or: 
But now I feel like saying things that comfort me and that are somewhat free. 
For example: Thursday is a day as transparent as the wings of an insect in the 
light. Just as Monday is a compact day. Deep down, well behind thought, I 
live off these ideas, if they are ideas. They’re sensations that transform 
themselves into ideas because I have to use words. (Lispector 1989, 76) 
Lispector also makes a point of using the material aspects of language that do not 
refer to explicit objects but which still guide our sensation of reading: punctuation. Colons 
represent her most conspicuous use of unorthodox punctuation in Água Viva.26 As Cixous 
notes:  
The text is strewn with colons. There are also dashes. What is the use of the 
colon? What is a colon? Generally, it opens onto an explanation, but it is 
always done with the help of an interruption. The colon is not a period; it is 
the period of the period, what cancels the period, a moment both mute and 
marked; it is the most delicate tattoo of the text. (1990, 20-21; emphasis 
added) 
The colon creates anticipation in the reader for a resolution of suspended meaning. As we 
encounter the colon, we pass through a temporary state of pause—“a moment mute and 
marked”—where we are delayed for an instant by a sign that indicates the 
postponement/promise of meaning. The novel as a whole creates a sense of suspended 
                                                             
26 As we saw at the end of the last chapter, Jorie Graham also uses colons in unusual ways, 
particularly in her later volumes. In these poems, the colons are used to string text together—
for example, “night air: look: it is a law: the air” (“Philosopher’s Stone” 2002b, 8)—so that 
multiple viewpoints are able to be represented at once, and also to create a sense of causal 
relationships or interdependencies between the objects and actions in the poem.  
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meaning as a novel that implies that it has no start or finish, and has no discernible plot. This 
state, the narrator suggests, is the state of being alive in one’s own animal body—with all that 
preceded birth being the clause before the colon, and death as the resolution that awaits one 
ahead:  
To such an extent is death only a future event that there are those who can’t 
stand it and commit suicide. It’s as if life said the following: and there simply 
wasn’t any following. Only the colon, waiting. We keep this secret in 
muteness to hide the fact that every instant is fatal. (Lispector 1989, 70) 
The colon’s “state of pause” is repeated over and over again with every passing “now-
instant” that Lispector marks with its “delicate tattoo.” Lispector’s colon both places 
emphasis on, and holds language in, a state of semiotic potentiality until the rest of the 
sentence passes into a logical, symbolic rendering on the other side of its pause (in those 
cases where it does). And this state of pause is also a state of “is,” in the sense that A:B (i.e. 
A “is,” or is “equal/related to,” B). As such, Lispector uses this state of pause to describe her 
protagonist’s passing moments of awareness of her own embodied, animal livingness (her 
“is”) that is the fragile and simple predicate of her being in the world. Thus, she suggests that 
the reality of human-animal living is a series of unfolding moments of fluid potentiality that 
represent a constant state of present-tense “is.”   
Another important feature in an animal semiotic reading of Água Viva is Lispector’s 
repetition of certain key phrases throughout the text, such that the novel’s structure mimics a 
pulsing, cyclical, and organic form. This repetition enacts one of the main motifs of the 
novel, the pulsing vein, to create a “living text”: “I may not have a sense, but it’s the very 
lack of sense that a pulsing vein has” (Lispector 1989, 8). The protagonist’s desire for a 
“living text” here aligns again with what she perceives in the animal: a state of “it” or “is” 
that does not rely on abstractions that signify anything beyond its being and presence.  
In addition to the main heartbeat of the novel—the repeated verb “is”—other phrases 
throb throughout Água Viva in constantly permutating iterations, but which appear more than 
once with the following wording: “esta é a vida vista pela vida” (1998a, 14; 19) (“this is life 
seen by life”; 1989, 8; 12), “dos instantes-jà” (1998a, 9; 11; 16; 17; 43; 69; 74; 93) (“the 
now-instant; 1989, 3; 5; 9; 10; 33; 56; 61; 74), and “atrás do pensamento” (1998a, 29; 33; 42; 
47; 65; 68; 71; 92) (“behind thought”; 1989, 21; 32; 34; 37; 53; 58; 71; 76). Through 
repeating these phrases a great number of times, Lispector again draws focus away from the 
denotative meanings of the words and directs it instead to the sound and shape of the 
language—particularly in the case of the lilting and near palindromic “esta é a vida vista pela 
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vida” (“this is life seen by life”)—to create a sense of an incantation or chant. The meaning of 
these phrases that beat throughout the body of the text is also important, however, as they 
emphasise a key theme in her writing. Lispector strives to capture the “it” of life, as a living 
animal herself, in the instant of its passing, and in a way that attempts to limits its abstraction 
into symbolic language—something that she sees as a regrettable humanising of what would 
otherwise be an immediate and unmitigated animal mode of contact with reality.  
Finally in our semiotic reading of the text, and in a very similar practice to Graham’s 
acts of adynaton, Lispector emphasises the materiality of her text over its declarative meaning 
by using indefinite pronouns and, in Água Viva, the algebraic substitution of the letter “X” for 
those things that elude her character’s symbolic rendering. We have already looked at how 
Lispector uses the third-person singular pronoun “it” to describe impersonal animal life in a 
way that avoids referring to the given individual’s perspective and selfhood. Lispector uses 
“it” to designate the other side of the narrating subject’s encounter with something within 
themselves, something which is the very condition of their being, but which they cannot 
consciously access—their animal livingness. In Lispector’s earlier novel, The Passion, this 
interaction between the conscious self and the “it” that exists “behind thought” takes place 
between two distinct entities—one human and one animal—but the encounter leads G.H. to 
the same meditation on the difference between being conscious and being alive that we find 
in Água Viva:  
Until now I had called life my sensitivity to life. But being alive is something 
else.  
 Being alive is a coarse radiating indifference. Being alive is 
unattainable by the finest sensitivity. Being alive is inhuman—the deepest 
meditation is so empty that a smile exhales as from a matter. (Lispector 2012, 
181) 
This amorphous and “unpronounceable” condition of being (designated elsewhere by “it” or 
“this”) at the core of Água Viva is also represented by the letter “X”:  
“X” is what exists within me. “X”—I bathe myself in that this. It’s 
unpronounceable. Everything I know is in “X.” Death? death is “X.” But a lot 
of life, too, for life is unpronounceable. … The unpronounceable instant. It 
would take a different sensibility to comprehend “X.” (Lispector 1989, 65) 
What “X” refers to may be “unpronounceable,” but it relies on the material body, and can 
only be gestured to through material text. As such, “X” is the neutral livingness which is an 
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invisible presence within, behind, or alongside the body and text, but which cannot exist 
without it: 
“X” is neither good nor bad. It always independs. But it only happens for what 
has a body. Although immaterial, it needs our body and the body of the thing. 
(Lispector 1989, 65) 
In Água Viva, the narrator suggests that while we might be able to see the living body and 
pronounce the symbolic word, this is not the same thing as seeing the life of that body or 
speaking the reality that the word refers to:  
Is “X” a word? The word only refers to a thing and that is something I can 
never reach. Each one of us is a symbol dealing with symbols—everything is a 
point of mere reference to the real. We seek desperately to find a proper 
identity and the identity of the real. And if we understand each other through 
the symbol it’s because we have the same symbols and experience of the thing 
itself: but reality has no synonyms. (Lispector 1989, 66) 
These statements have an echo of von Uexküll’s theory of Umwelten: what we 
perceive of reality (and the visible bodies of those we interact with) is only what is made 
available to us through our own body and its attendant perceptual cues, and we can only 
deduce a shared reality between individuals (both human and nonhuman) where those 
perceptual cues overlap. Lispector’s protagonist goes further in her statements, however, to 
claim that our human subjective experience is twice removed from reality because we cover it 
with symbolic meanings that can provide only a secondary “point of mere reference to the 
real.” Lispector tries, then, inasmuch as it is possible, to use language in what is for her an 
animal semiotic mode: to gesture towards something that is felt rather than understood. In 
doing so, she aims to create a text that might help us become aware of our own embodied 
animality, which precedes, and continues to act upon, the human symbolic. 
 In both The Passion and Água Viva, Lispector uses animality as a subversive semiotic 
force that challenges the human symbolic mode as it attempts to capture/transmit the 
inexpressive “it” of life itself. However, while Lispector suggests that all beings, animal and 
human, are connected through this transcendent “it” of life, her attention is mostly focused on 
how this livingness presents as something “animal” and “impersonal” within the human. She 
gives very little thought to how to reciprocally recognise the diverse subjectivities of animal 
others. As such, Lispector’s novels that interrogate what it is to be a human animal—without 
considering the many ways of being a nonhuman animal—are unable to make any 
meaningful steps towards overcoming the human-animal binary. Through using animal 
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figures as an index of “impersonal life,” Lispector does, however, find a highly inventive way 
to imagine an alternative to “human” modes of selfhood, thinking, and expression, and, in 
doing so, demonstrates an exceptional ability to find flexibility within the structures of 





This thesis has examined, through examples of work by Clarice Lispector and Jorie Graham, 
how writers can expose, complicate, and elaborate on the human-animal divide to explore its 
effect on our relations with nonhuman animal others, and, indeed, on how we view the 
human. Each of the texts I have analysed has offered a slightly different, always partial 
answer to how writers can modulate this divide through writing. Whether the binary is 
approached through attempts to describe the phenomenal worlds of animals in human 
language, or through attempts to re-conceive of one’s own human self as an animal being, 
Lispector’s and Graham’s investigations demonstrate that any attempt to overcome or define 
the division between human and animal ways of being is ultimately frustrated by the diffuse 
and many-layered abyss that separates the two.   
 For authors, like Lispector and Graham, who choose to “stay with the trouble” 
(Haraway 2016) of deeply considering the unknowable lives of animal others, and, who, in 
turn, investigate their own animal being, the results of their labour are often highly innovative 
texts that can stimulate new ways of thinking about both human and nonhuman animals.  
 In the first movement of this thesis, I demonstrated how Lispector and Graham reveal, 
through their self-reflexive and philosophical texts, some of the difficulties that writers 
encounter when attempting to describe animals, as well as the pressure these difficulties have 
exerted on their works. Often animal representation seems to present an ultimatum: the author 
must choose between representing their animal figures as completely “other” to human 
thought and language that fails to contain them, or choose to elide the differences between 
human and animal experiences through domesticating anthropomorphism. In reading 
Lispector and Graham, I argued that, while both authors have produced work that could be 
placed at either of these poles, they developed new ways to temper this uncompromising 
situation through a sophisticated and critical use of the textual strategies of adynaton, 
defamiliarisation, and anthropomorphism.  
In the second movement of this thesis, I demonstrated how both authors again use 
defamiliarisation to not only imagine the alterity of nonhuman animal experiences, but also to 
draw attention to, and thoroughly reconsider, the human as contingent on animal being. This 
exploration revealed a tension between Graham’s perceived moral necessity to retain a sense 
of a unified human self that is responsible for their actions in the world and Lispector’s 
project to dissolve human subjectivity in order to find new avenues for expressing one’s own 
living animality against the structures of human symbolic order.  
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 The question of how we can better apprehend or represent animal lives and their 
relation to our human selves is one that will likely extend as far into our future as it does into 
our past (that is, of course, only if we make drastic improvements in our efforts at this critical 
time to protect and share our planet with its manifold animal species). It is entirely possible 
that we may never do any better than imagine the lives of animals beyond the human. But this 
work of the imagination is both necessary and productive. Imagining animal lives in text 
offers an opportunity to better attend to, and perhaps foster feelings of responsibility towards, 
animal beings and subjectivities. It also offers a space to better consider our own human 
being as intimately dependent upon our own (and other) animal lives and bodies. There has 
never been a period of time where this work was more necessary both to protect the diverse 
self-worlds of fast disappearing animal species, and to realise the reliance of our human 
cultures and ways of being on the material world and on those other animal beings who live 
in it. Animal-centric texts help us to do both of these things. And, while we may not be able 
to dissolve, remove, or dismantle the human-animal divide and reach into the self-worlds of 
animal others, literature can enrich and diversify our ideas of the categories that lie on either 
side of it and help us towards a more mindful consideration of our interactions with other 
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